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Abstract 
This study evaluates the visibility and communication of 
cohesion policy in online media. It employs a mixed methods 
approach to investigate media coverage, representation and 
user perceptions of cohesion policy in online media. The research 
draws on an original dataset of over 60,000 news articles and 
100,000 user-generated comments. It also analyses social media 
– over 11,000 Facebook posts and over five million tweets on 
Twitter – and 13,000 EU press releases. The key conclusion is that 
cohesion policy visibility is relatively low in online media. Policy 
recommendations are provided to improve cohesion policy 
visibility particularly through citizen engagement. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This study evaluates the visibility and communication of cohesion policy in online media and the 
effectiveness of communication activities. A mixed methods approach is employed to investigate the 
coverage, representation and user perceptions of cohesion policy in online media, including 
quantitative text mining techniques, as well as more qualitative approaches based on framing analysis 
and expert interviews. The research draws on a database of 60,000 online news articles in ten Member 
States and over 100,000 reader comments. It also analysed social media - over 11,000 Facebook posts 
and over five million tweets on Twitter - and 13,000 EU press releases.  
The visibility of cohesion policy in online news media stories is relatively low, with many 
references to the policy being little more than an acknowledgement of their contribution to projects. 
Cohesion policy is more visible in national media, but regional and local media are more likely to 
provide some depth to their coverage at the project level.  
The tone of news media coverage is generally positive, particularly so in regional/local media. News 
stories tend to be framed around the socio-economic consequences of the funds in terms of economic 
development, jobs, infrastructure and social inclusion. Institutional bargaining is a very dominant 
theme, with stories giving prominence to the reform of the Multiannual Financial Framework. 
There are significant differences across countries in visibility, tone, framing and bias. Member 
States with higher levels of cohesion policy funding tend to have greater visibility and more positive 
tone. The proportion of bias (or myths) in cohesion policy news stories is less variable and relatively low 
(7 percent of stories). Most of the myths propagated in online news are about fraud, mismanagement 
and the lack of added value. News stories with myths are most prevalent in some (though not all) of 
the net payer countries. 
Turning to social media, the visibility of facebook posts on cohesion policy by EU institutions, 
European political parties and interests groups is relatively low, constituting 6 percent of their 
total facebook activity. Of these, almost 60 percent are by DG REGIO followed (a long way behind) by 
the CPMR and Commissioner for Regional Policy. Most FB posts are neutral in tone, providing factual 
information, although DG REGIO posts are generally more positive than posts by other actors.  
The visibility of cohesion policy in Twitter is low among the 2019 European Parliament election 
candidates relative to their overall Twitter activity and in terms of frequency. Around 15 percent of the 
candidates with a Twitter account tweeted about cohesion policy during the period January-June 2019, 
on average 3 times, and generally in positive terms. DG REGIO produced the largest number of tweets 
followed by ‘EU influencers’ (typically journalists, EU officials and academics) and interest groups. The 
tone was overwhelmingly positive, significantly more so than for the EP candidates. Public discussion 
about cohesion policy are relatively low key but often lively in terms of politicisation and sentiment.  
Cohesion policy is well represented in European Commission press releases relative to other EU 
policy domains, but less so in the press activity of other EU institutions and political parties. Overall, 
press releases from EU institutions tend to focus on socio-economic issues, whereas the political parties 
are more likely to frame their press releases in terms of power issues (institutional bargaining, 
empowerment, conditionality etc.). 
The main conclusion is that the communication of cohesion policy in online media has been weak 
in recent years, despite the increased political priority placed on communication by EU institutions. 
Media coverage is often shallow, with limited depth of understanding or analysis and there is little 
appreciation of the role of the EU or wider impact of the policy.   
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A key precondition for greater visibility and better communication is greater citizen 
engagement in the policy, particularly at the programming stage. The main recommendation of this 
study is the need to promote a citizen-centred approach to programming through democratic 
innovations, including the piloting of participatory budgeting. The European Parliament should strive 
to ensure that the public have a real say on what is funded in their local area by one of the largest and 
most visible areas of EU expenditure impacting on their daily lives.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been a significant increase in the priority placed by European Union (EU) institutions on 
improving the visibility and communication of EU cohesion policy in recent years. This is part of a 
broader EU agenda to reconnect with citizens by demonstrating the benefits of the EU for their daily 
lives in the aftermath of financial, economic and political crises that have increased mistrust in EU 
institutions and eurosceptic public opinion in parts of the EU. Online and social media provide crucial 
communication channels for pursuing this reconnection, especially given their growing use as sources 
of information on the EU by citizens across all Member States.  
While public awareness of cohesion policy among EU citizens has increased over time, it remains 
relatively low overall with only 40 percent of citizens being aware of EU-funded projects in their region 
or city in 2019.1 Over eighty percent of citizens that are aware of projects consider that the impact has 
been positive but only 28 percent of citizens that have heard of the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) or Cohesion Fund (CF) think that they have benefitted in their daily life from EU-funded 
projects. Interestingly, the internet is the third most important source of knowledge on cohesion policy 
- after the television and newspapers – and is witnessing the most rapid increase in usage by citizens 
as an informational channel on cohesion policy. 
Set against this context, this study analyses the visibility and communication of cohesion policy in 
online media in terms of its coverage, representation and perceptions by media users. To do so, the 
study has collected original data in the form of 60,000 online news articles in ten Member States, over 
100,000 reader comments on news stories, 11,000 Facebook posts, over five million tweets on Twitter, 
and around 13,000 press releases by EU institutions and political parties. A mixed methods approach is 
employed to investigate the coverage, representation and user perceptions of cohesion policy in 
online media, including quantitative text mining techniques, as well as more qualitative approaches. 
This report is structured as follows: 
• Section 2 begins by setting out the research objectives, analytical framework and 
methodology. The empirical analysis is structured around analysis of three media channels – 
online news, social media and EU press releases.  
 
• Section 3 analyses cohesion policy in online news media, including readers’ commentary, 
through framing analysis and text mining of media visibility, thematic coverage and tone.  
 
• Section 4 turns to social media, providing an assessment of the visibility, engagement and 
tone of Facebook posts and Twitter activity.  
 
• Section 5 assesses EU-level Press Release activity by EU institutions and political parties in 
terms of volume and visibility and with other policy domains.  
 
• Section 6 explores challenges and lessons for improving the visibility and communication 
of cohesion policy, drawing on in-depth interviews with communication experts and a 
literature review.  
 
• Section 7 draws out the main conclusions and presents recommendations to inform the 
future work of the REGI Committee. 
  
                                                             
1  TNS (2019) Citizens’ awareness and perceptions of EU regional policy, Flash Eurobarometer 480, DG Communication, European 
Commission, Brussels. 
IPOL | Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
10 
  
The Visibility and Communication of cohesion policy in Online Media 
 
11 
2. OBJECTIVES, FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY 
 
The four specific research aims of the study are to analyse:  
1. the coverage of cohesion policy in online media;  
2. the representation of cohesion policy in online media;  
3. the perceptions of cohesion policy as experienced by online media users; and  
4. the effectiveness of communication activities on cohesion policy by the EU 
institutions, MEPs and candidates. 
 
The analytical framework of the study is structured according to these four overlapping research aims, 
which are operationalised through a series of indicators. The coverage of cohesion policy in online 
media assesses the volume of media content in popular channels of online news (in ten Member 
States), social media (Facebook and Twitter) and EU institutional press releases (covering all EU 
institutions and political parties). A second analytical component maps out the representation of 
cohesion policy is represented by news and in public discussion on online media in terms of visibility, 
the topics emphasised, the tone and the degree to which bias is detected. The perceptions of 
stakeholders and the wider public is analysed through measures of volume and tone, as well as social 
media engagement (e.g. tweets, likes, retweets relative to followers), the visibility of MEP twitter 
activity, and the views of communication and media experts. The overall effectiveness of 
communication activities draws together these different analytical dimensions.  
The methodological approach comprises four tasks: (1) online news media analysis; (2) social media 
analysis; (3) institutional and policy perspectives; and (4) conclusions and recommendations. A mixed 
methods approach is employed included automated techniques for state-of-the-art data collection 
and web crawling, computational text analysis as well as more qualitative techniques in the form of 
framing analysis, in-depth interviews and desk-based research. 
Online news media analysis 
Online news media analysis requires the collection and analysis of cohesion policy related stories 
disseminated through online media channels. A Python script was developed to search the News API 
of Event Registry, a leading media intelligence platform for searching past news content. Over 60,000 
news articles were generated from ten Member States. The countries/languages have been selected to 
ensure variation in cohesion policy awareness, funding allocations, and online activity. 
The core of the analysis was an in-depth framing analysis. The primary focus was on how cohesion 
policy stories are represented as the visibility of cohesion policy across news stories, the thematic 
coverage and tone, the nature of the topics covered, the geographical level (national or regional/local) 
and the presence of bias. Quantitative analysis was employed to analyse the frames. 
Two supplementary analyses were undertaken to investigate the thematic coverage, tone and public 
reactions to online news covering a larger volume of news stories. First, a subset of the news articles 
with the highest visibility and among the most prominent media organisations was translated into 
English using machine learning tools. Topic modelling and sentiment analysis were then applied to the 
sample to investigate thematic coverage of news stories (topic modeling) and their tone (sentiment 
analysis).  A second dimension of the analysis focused on the analysis of news comments by readers of 
the stories, so-called User-Generated Content (UGC). The architecture of the web pages allowed a 
subset of countries (seven altogether) with a sufficient volume of data to be crawled and analysed 
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quantitatively. This exercise generated a corpus of over 100,000 user-generated comments to enable 
analysis of the key issues that are actively discussed by readers of cohesion policy news stories. 
Social Media analysis 
The second task analyses social media with a specific focus on Facebook and Twitter. Both platforms 
provide certain features (likes, shares, retweets, etc.) that allow for quantitative analysis of the volume. 
For Facebook the data collection method involved the creation of an automated tool (web crawler) to 
collect posts from Facebook pages. A total of 23 Facebook pages ranging from EU institutions and 
agencies, through to interest organisations and European political party groups were crawled 
generating over 11,000 Facebook posts from 2014 onwards. Standard quantitative analysis (as well as 
computational text analysis techniques such as sentiment analysis) could then be performed on the 
Facebook post data.  
Twitter historical data was purchased from Twitter directly based on a search for tweets with relevant 
keywords and hashtags over the period January 2019 to June 2019. A collection of over 5 million tweets 
was generated from the query in all EU languages. Since a core research request for this study was to 
follow the use of Twitter during the European Parliament elections and the visibility of cohesion policy 
therein, it was necessary to build a separate database with the list of candidates competing in the 2019 
election. Over 8,000 candidates were identified and coded as to whether they had a Twitter account. 
Merging the two datasets (Twitter data with candidate profiles) allows analysis of the degree to which 
cohesion policy was actively discussed and disseminated (‘likes’, ‘shares’, retweets etc.).   
Improving visibility and communication – academic, expert and institutional perspectives 
The third research task investigated EU institutional and policy perspectives on communication and 
online media. It was divided into three main sub-tasks: (1) analysis of EU institutional news outputs on 
cohesion policy; (2) interviews with experts and practitioners; and (3) desk research and literature 
review to gain comparative insights.  
The analysis of EU news output involved crawling EU institutional and political party websites for all 
press releases by the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and the European groups of 
political parties. To ensure comparability across the institutions and parties only documents that were 
press releases were stored, generating a dataset of approximately 13,000 press releases that is analysed 
using quantitative and automated techniques.  
Finally, desk research of academic and policy research and interviews with experts in cohesion policy 
communication and in broader EU digital media and citizen engagement was undertaken to provide a 
wider perspective on the challenges and lessons for increasing the visibility and improving the 
communication of cohesion policy. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The final research task synthesising the results and provides conclusions and recommendations.  
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3. ONLINE NEWS MEDIA 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The visibility of cohesion policy within online news stories is low, with many 
references being little more than an acknowledgement of funding. Visibility is 
greater in national media, but regional/local media are more likely to provide depth 
to their coverage.  
 
• The tone of media coverage is generally positive, particularly in regional/local 
media. News stories tend to be framed around the socio-economic effects or 
implications in terms of economic development, jobs, infrastructure and social 
inclusion. Institutional bargaining is a very dominant theme, especially the reform of 
the MFF. 
 
• There are significant differences across countries in visibility, tone and framing. 
Member States with higher levels of cohesion policy funding tend to have greater 
visibility and more positive tone. 
 
• The visibility of bias or myths in news stories about cohesion policy is relatively 
low. Most myths are about fraud, mismanagement and lack of added value. News 
stories with myths are most prevalent in some (though not all) of the net payer 
countries. 
 
• There is a duality in the thematic coverage of cohesion policy in news stories. 
There is significant coverage of important thematic objectives of the policy. 
However, the politics of the policy is also a significant focus, especially of actual or 
proposed conditionalities of the Funds, and the budget negotiations. 
 
 
To analyse cohesion policy in online media, this section draws on the corpus of online news stories to 
employ (1) Framing Analysis, (2) Topic and Sentiment Analysis and (3) Analysis of User-Generated 
Content. Since it will condition the range of analytical strategies deployed, it is important to begin by 
describing the attributes of this database of online news stories.  Figure 1 lists the results of the news 
search for ten EU member states using a set of harmonised keywords for cohesion policy, the funds 
(ESIF, Structural Funds) and individual funds (ERDF, CF, ESF). This amounted to just over 60,000 news 
stories over the period 2014-2019, after the removal of duplicates.  
There is high variability in the number of stories. Most cases generated a substantial volume of stories 
with the exception of Finland. The low volume of news in the Finnish case prevent the application of 
topic modelling, sentiment analysis and user-generated content analysis, although it was possible to 
incorporate Finland for the core and more in-depth Framing analysis. 
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Figure 1:  Total number of online news stories on cohesion policy in 2014-19 by country 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of online media stories over time revealing a general increase in most 
cases, as depicted by the regression line in red. At the same time, the peaks and troughs in activity 
suggest a clustering around specific events. 
Figure 2:  Evolution of media stories over time 
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The visibility of key cohesion policy terms in online news media across countries is illustrated in Figure 
3. For visualisation purposes, the acronym are used for the ERDF, ESF and ESIF (rather than the full 
terms) and in English (rather than the national language). The distribution of key terms shows that tn 
some countries, such as Germany and Austria, the relative focus of online news media is on the terms 
‘Structural Funds’ or ‘EU regional policy’. In the case of Italy, we found that a very high number of stories 
on ‘regional policy’ were about domestic policy and the term was therefore excluded. The umbrella 
term cohesion policy is the most visible in Poland and Romania. With respect to the individual funds, 
the term ERDF is relatively more visible in UK news media, while others such as Spain have a high 
volume of ESF news. Notable by its relative infrequency is the term ESIF - European Structural and 
Investment Funds, a more recent umbrella term introduced in the 2013 reform that has gained limited 
traction in online news media.  
Figure 3:  Distribution of key terms per country  
 
 
3.1 Media framing  
To analyse how cohesion policy is represented in online media, a framing analysis of media coverage 
was undertaken. Media framing analysis is grounded on Entman’s paradigmatic thesis that framing is 
to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in 
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation”.2 This entails that media outlets can communicate the same issue 
in several different ways, by placing emphasis on different aspects of the issue in question, and thus 
trigger different evaluations in the public’s perception.  
The presence of news frames in media coverage of EU-related issues has been well-documented by 
empirical research.3 Scholars have applied a range of methodological approaches to record and 
                                                             
2 Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51–58. 
3 Semetko, H. A. and Valkenburg, P. M. (2000) ‘Framing European Politics: A ContentAnalysis of Press and Television News’, Journal of 
Communication (50(2)): 93–109; de Vreese, C.H, Peter J and Semetko H.A (2001) ‘Framing Politics at the Launch of the Euro: A Cross-
National Comparative Study of Frames in the News’, Political ommunication 18(2): 107–122; Schuck, A. R. T. and de Vreese, C. H. (2006) 
‘Between Risk and Opportunity: News Framing and its Effects on Public Support for EU Enlargement’, European Journal of 
Communication 21(1): 5–32; Azrout, R., Spanje, J. V. and Vreese, C. D. (2012) ‘When News Matters: Media Effects on Public Support for 
European Union Enlargement in 21 Countries’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 50(5): 691–708.  
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categorize media framing and its effects.4 The analytical framework employed here draws on a pre-
defined list of generic frames from the existing literature that are pertinent to the study of cohesion 
policy, complemented with additional sub-frames that have been validated in a previous study 
(Table 1).5  
Table 1:  Framing analytical framework 
Frames Subframes 
Socio-economic 
consequences 
1) job creation 2) social justice 3) social awareness/inclusion 4) economic 
development 5) research and innovation 6) tackling brain drain 7) public 
services 8) infrastructure 9) environment 10) cultural heritage 11) cultural 
development 12) civic participation 13) territorial cooperation 14) ineffective 
in achieving goals 
Values 15) solidarity 16) financial burden 
Governance  
 
17) improving governance 18) bureaucracy and delays 19) mismanagement 
20) fraud and corruption 21) poor communication 
Power  
 
22) empowerment 23) lose sovereignty 24) political leverage 25) institutional 
bargaining over funding 26) political capital/interests 
 
For each of the 10 countries, 100 articles were sampled randomly from the corpus of news media 
stories. The sample was taken from the most popular news media sites in the corpus using the well-
known Alexa rank metric based on the volume of site visitors. The precise threshold varied across 
countries, but in most cases it involved selecting among the top thirty ranked media sites from our 
corpus. Each story was coded by researchers with expertise on cohesion policy and/or framing analysis 
using the list of 26 subframes.6 The research team also assessed each news story for the visibility of 
cohesion policy in the story, the tone of the frame/subframe and for the presence of bias or myths.  
Visibility of cohesion policy  
The starting point for the analysis was to assess the visibility of cohesion policy in the news stories. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of visibility as measured on two different scales, a five-point and a three-
point scale. The key finding is that the visibility of cohesion policy in terms of its prominence within 
stories is low. On the five-point scale, the most frequent value is very low. This suggests that in almost 
half of the media stories in prominent country-level press, the visibility of cohesion policy takes the 
form of a single acknowledgment of the principal funds, the ERDF or the ESF, typically in terms of the 
co-financing to a specific project. This is hardly surprising given that a news story about a project would 
primarily focus on what the project is about rather than discussing cohesion policy. 
                                                             
4 de Vreese Claes H. and Kandyla Anna (2009) ‘News Framing and Public Support for a Common Foreign and Security Policy’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 47(3): 453–481; de Vreese, C. H., Boomgaarden, H. G. and Semetko, H. A. (2011) ‘(In)direct Framing Effects: The 
Effects of News Media Framing on Public Support for Turkish Membership in the European Union’, Communication Research 38(2): 179–
205. 
5 Triga, V. and Vadratsikas, K. (2017b) Framing of cohesion policy, COHESIFY Research Paper 9, http://www.cohesify.eu/research-papers/ 
6  The framing analysis team included Alina Dragos, Fabian Gal, Stefan Kah, Carlos Mendez, Vasiliki Triga and Katarzyna Szoka, as well as 
the core study authors. 
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Figure 4:  Visibility of cohesion policy in media stories 
 
Further inspection of the data reveals that there is a significant association between the visibility of 
cohesion policy within news stories and whether the website is a regional/local news source or a 
national one.  
Figure 5 shows the chi-square residuals for testing the association between the territorial level of a 
news source and a story’s visibility. The plots shows whether an observed count for a category is above, 
below or within an expected range. Blue bars indicate that observed count is significantly higher than 
expected, while red bars indicate the inverse i.e. that the count is significantly lower than expected.  
Grey bars indicate that the observed count for a particular category is within an expected range. Figure 
5 shows that there is a clear and significant association between the territorial level of a news source 
(regional or national) and the visibility of cohesion policy in news stories. In national media cohesion 
policy is more likely to have a high visibility in a story. The opposite is the case for regional media, where 
the visibility of cohesion policy in a news story is significantly lower than expected.  
Figure 5:  Association of visibility by territorial level  
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Note: For each category in the plot, the size of the bars (or blocks) are proportional to the number of observations 
for that particular category. The Low Visibility and Regional/local territorial level category is much bigger than 
the adjacent Medium Visibility category because there are many more observations in the former category. 
 
On the other hand, the reporting of cohesion policy by regional/local media is most likely to take the 
form of acknowledgement and/or citing of funds and EU co-finance to specific projects. This is in line 
with expectations as regional and local news are more likely to contain stories on projects in their area. 
It is important to note that there is striking country level variability across the ten countries, as shown 
in Figure 6. The second plot (three-point scale of visibility) shows that there are two groups. On the one 
hand, Italy, Greece, Poland and Romania have a more uniform looking distributions where the low 
visibility is below the 50 percent mark, depicted by the dashed horizontal line. On the other hand, for 
the remaining countries the percentage of stories with low visibility of cohesion policy is much higher 
with a range of 62 percent (Finland) to 82 percent (Germany).  
 
Figure 6:  Visibility of cohesion policy in media stories by country 
 
 
Tone of media coverage 
To investigate the tone of the news stories, the analysis distinguishes between positive and negative 
tone, balanced tone (combining positive and negative tone), and factual tone when the story is 
descriptive. Looking at the tone of media stories in Figure 7 reveals an overall positive picture at the 
aggregate level. News stories are much more likely to be positive and far less negative, factual or 
balanced in tone. 
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Figure 7:  Tone of news stories across ten Member States   
 
National news is more likely to be neutral (balanced and factual) or adopt a negative tone than 
regional/local news ( 
Figure 8). The inverse is the case for regional/local news, which tends to be less neutral and more 
positive than national news.   
 
Figure 8:  Association between tone and territorial level 
 
Note:   For each category in the plot, the size of the bars (or blocks) are proportional to the number of  
  observations for that particular category.  
 
There are notable variations among countries in terms of the tone of news media stories (Figure 9). 
Countries with the most positive tone are the UK, Greece, Spain and Finland. By contrast, the most 
negative tone can be found in Austria, Germany and Romania. There is also a high level of balanced 
news combining both positive and negative view-points in Germany, Italy and Austria. Finally, there is 
a high level of factual reporting on cohesion policy in France and to a lesser extent Finland. 
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Figure 9 Tone of cohesion policy news stories grouped by country 
 
 
A more graphic picture emerges in Figure 10 where the negative score is subtracted from the positive 
score to give an overall view of positive tone across the ten Member States. Only in Austria and 
Germany are the negative tone scores higher than positive scores leading to an overall negative score.    
 
Figure 10:  Difference between positive and negative percent scores 
 
 
To better understand the tone distribution it is crucial to take into account the dominant frames 
underpinning the news stories. As shown in Figure 11, most media stories are framed around the Socio-
Economic consequences frame, followed by the Power frame. 
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Figure 11:  Dominant frames in media stories  
  
 
The territorial level of the news sources is also important in understanding the distribution of frames. 
The residuals in  
Figure 12 show how the territorial level of the news source is significant for two of the main frames. 
While the national level news media is less likely to frame cohesion policy news in terms of Socio-
Economic consequences and more likely to employ the Power frame, the inverse is the case for the 
regional/local media. The latter’s focus is more likely to be on the Socio-Economic consequences of 
cohesion policy (for their region/locality) than the high-level politics associated with the Power frame.  
 
Figure 12:  Association between Frames and territorial level 
 
 
Note:  The size of each block in the mosaic plot represents the proportion of observations for each group  
 
Figure 13 gives an indication of the sources of the overall positive scores. For most countries, the socio-
economic consequences frame is dominant. Since this frame is about the potential or actual socio-
economic benefits of cohesion policy funding and projects it is typically positive, and helps to explain 
why most countries - Finland, Greece, Spain and the UK in particular – have such high scores. On the 
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other hand, only in Austria and Germany is the Power frame more prevalent than the socio-economic 
frame. The Power frame has some distinctive sub-frames that are negative.  
Figure 13:  Dominant frames in media stories grouped by country 
 
 
Figure 14 below includes a list of all the subframes and their prevalence across the media stories in the 
ten Member States. It shows that the institutional bargaining over funding frame is the most dominant, 
accounting for around a fifth of all subframes. This reflects the redistributive nature of the policy and is 
particularly prominent in media coverage of debates on the reform of the Multi-annual Financial 
Framework.  
In the UK case, this subframe includes a significant number of stories on Brexit and the potential loss of 
cohesion policy funding for the UK. Similarly, a substantial number of stories in the Austrian, French 
German cases highlight the increased contributions that Brexit will imply for funding cohesion policy. 
By contrast, there are many Polish media stories highlighting how Brexit will lower the funding for 
Poland, although most of the Polish stories focus on the amount of funding that Poland received or will 
receive from the EU budget.  
The second dominant subframe, also under the ‘power’ frame, is ‘political leverage’ accounting for 11.8 
percent of all subframes. This subframe is particularly prominent in Austrian, French, German and Polish 
media (Figure 12), where there is a large number of stories discussing debates on making EU funding 
conditional on compliance with the rule of law or accepting migrants.  
The next four subframes on economic development, jobs, infrastructure and social 
awareness/inclusion all belong to the socio-economic consequences frame. The economic 
development frame is most prominent in the UK case, where there are many project stories, especially 
in regional/local media sources. The same applies to the Romanian case, where there are many stories 
under the infrastructure and jobs subframes describing EU funded projects. On the other hand, 
negative stories under the ‘fraud and corruption’ and ‘mismanagement’ subframes are also over-
represented in the Romanian media relative to other countries. 
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Figure 14:   Subframes in media stories across all ten Member States 
 
 
Figure 15:  Subframes in media stories by Member States 
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Bias and myths 
This final section analysis media bias in terms of the presence of common myths on cohesion policy in 
online news. Specifically, the news stories were assessed for the presence of the ten most common 
myths about EU cohesion policy as identified by DG REGIO (Table 2).  
 
Table 2:  Ten myths about cohesion policy 
Myth Myth description 
1. Poor regions funded only 
 
CP only helps poor regions 
2. Rich countries pay  Only less developed countries are benefitting from cohesion policy, 
while rich ones are paying for it 
 
3. Firms/jobs relocate to 
poorer countries 
CP causes job losses in richer countries by supporting companies’ 
relocation to poorer countries  
 
4. No added value CP has no added value e.g. in reducing disparities, economic impact, 
results 
 
5. Useless projects Useless projects are funded with EU money 
 
6. Does not defend EU values CP does not contribute to defending EU fundamental values (gender 
equality, non-discrimination, freedom, democracy) 
 
7. Fraud CP is all about fraud 
 
8. Mismanaged CP funding is often mismanaged 
 
9. Inaccessible CP funds are inaccessible 
 
10. Slow spending Some countries have a very low rate of spending CP funds 
 
Source: DG REGIO: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/EN/policy/what/myth-busting/ 
 
Figure 16 shows the proportion of myths detected across the ten Member States. The percentages are 
on the whole very small for the individual myths. Very few cohesion policy news stories contain myths 
as defined above. Nonetheless, the number of myths do add up just over 6.6 percent of stories.  
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Figure 16:  Myths detected in media stories across all ten Member States 
 
 
 
There is high variability in the distribution of myths across the Member States. Some countries 
contain a very low level of detected myths (notably Poland, Greece and Spain), while others have high 
levels. Germany, Italy France and Austria have around 10 percent, followed by the UK and Finland at 8 
percent. In Germany, the dominant myth is that cohesion policy does not defend EU values (Table 3), 
notably in the context of debates about conditionality to encourage fair burden sharing of refugees 
during the migration crisis and to tackle deficiencies in the rule of law. In Italy, the fraud and slow 
spending myths account for the majority of the myths. Aside from Romania, the largest recipients of 
cohesion policy funding in our country sample have the fewest reported myths, mainly relating to ‘poor 
regions being funded exclusively’ (Poland), ‘the relocation of economic activity’ and ‘mismanagement’ 
(Greece), and ‘fraud’ (Spain). 
Figure 17:  Myths detected in media stories grouped by country 
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The ‘rich countries pay’ myth is present in some of the net payer countries (Austria, Germany and, in 
particular, the UK in the context of Brexit debates especially) though not in all net payer countries (e.g. 
Finland, France), yet in France a related myth about cohesion policy funding being only for poor regions 
is particularly dominant. The two myths that appear across most Member States (six countries in both 
cases) are about ‘fraud’ and ‘mismanagement’, followed by the ‘no added value’ myth (in five 
countries). 
Table 3:  Ten myths detected in media stories by country 
Myth AT FI FR DE EL IT PL RO ES UK 
10.Slow spend 1     2  1   
1.Poor regions funded only   6 1   1    
2.Rich countries pay 2   2      5 
3.Firms/jobs relocate      1 1     
4.No added value 1 2  1  1  2  1 
5.Useless projects  1        1 
6.Does not defend EU values 1 1  4  1     
7.Fraud 2  1 1  3   2 1 
8.Mismanaged 3  2 2 1 1  1   
9.Inaccessible      1     
 
3.2 Topics and sentiment  
A quantitative analysis was undertaken of the thematic coverage and tone of online news in a sample 
of 3,000 media stories (500 media stories from six countries). Six cases were analysed because the 
filtering criteria of 500 stories removed the Austrian and Finnish cases, and the available translation 
tools required to perform the quantitative analysis did not cover Romanian and Greek. The sample was 
stratified to select from the more visible media sites as determined by Alexa rankings. Random samples 
were drawn from the top 40 media sites for a country, while taking care not to oversample the same 
news source, very rare news sources or specific keywords.  
To identify the dominant themes in the data, an automated topic modelling text analysis technique is 
used that is well-suited to identifying topical patterns in a large volume of documents. The analysis 
reveals a coherent pattern of topic clusters that are shown in Figure 18. Topics relating to core policy 
objectives and themes receive high coverage, notably ‘Employment, Training and Education’, 
‘Economic development, jobs and growth, and ‘Research & Innovation’ are among the most prevalent 
topics.  
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Figure 18:  Topic distributions 
 
 
A second key finding is that there is a significant focus on the politics surrounding cohesion policy 
conditionality and EU budget negotiations. This finding echoes the results from the framing analysis in 
which there are two dominant frames structuring how cohesion policy is represented in the media: the 
‘Socio-economic consequences’ and ‘Power’ frames. The clustering of topics identified by the topic 
modelling closely matches this ordering. 
The evolution of each topic over time is shown in Figure 19. Some topics have lots of overlapping error 
bars, such as the topics ‘Economic development’, ‘Employment, training and education’ and ‘Research 
and Innovation’ (with the exception of the year 2019), which indicates a more equally distributed 
discussion of topics and themes over time. Other topics appear to be punctuated by emphasis during 
particular periods. This is quite obviously the case with the Brexit topic or the Greek crisis and 
conditionality topic. The latter is highly prevalent between 2014 through to 2016 then almost 
disappears and only reappears in 2019.  
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Figure 19:  Topic distributions over time 
 
 
A third key finding is that conditionality is a prevalent and distinctive topic in several forms: migration 
crisis debates, notably in relation to debates about linking the acceptance of migration quotas to 
cohesion policy funds; macro-economic conditionality, with many stories focusing on the controversy 
surrounding whether Spain and Portugal would be penalised for breaching stability and growth pact 
rules in 2016; and the Greek crisis and associated conditionality and investment support through the 
bailout and adjustment programmes.  
The dual nature of stories on policy objectives on the one hand, and more politicised EU budget 
negotiations and conditionality coverage on the other hand, can also be seen when conducting 
sentiment analysis of the tone of online news on cohesion policy. Figure 20 shows that there are topics 
which elicit more negative tone, namely those relating to Brexit and Conditionality. On the other hand, 
topics dealing with policy objectives tend to be overwhelmingly positive, notably ‘Employment, 
training and education’. 
The Visibility and Communication of cohesion policy in Online Media 
 
29 
Figure 20:  Sentiment score per topic 
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3.3 User comments 
To explore public reactions to online media, this section analyses online commentary on cohesion 
policy news stories on media sites. As citizens increasingly consume their news via the internet, there 
are unparalleled opportunities for immediate citizen feedback in online discussions spontaneously 
generated among readers. This is especially prominent among some of the more popular news sites, 
and is a development that has proliferated across all countries albeit to different degrees. The term user 
generated content (UGC) is used in this report to refer to the comments and feedback that is generated 
by readers of online news content.  
A number of criteria were used to select the sites. First, it was necessary for the website's comments 
section to be crawl-able, i.e., the absence of paywall or special user account requirements. Second, the 
focus was on the more popular websites. The third criterion was volume which is necessary for 
quantitative analysis. Lastly, that there were at least a number of stories from the same site such that 
averages could be calculated with some degree of reliability.    
The data collection focused on two of the most popular news sites per country. Since text translation 
into English was applied to all the content, only the news site of those countries with languages that 
could be translated were crawled for online comments. Overall, around 100,000 user-generated 
comments were gathered from 14 online news sites across seven EU member states. The list of 
countries and news sites are presented in Table 4.   
Table 4: List of online news site crawled with comments 
Country Site Average comments per story Max. #comments 
UK Daily Mail 162 1559 
UK Guardian 196 4833 
Spain El mundo 6 515 
Spain El Pais 23 1136 
Italy Il Fatto Quotidiano 45 504 
Italy Il Giornale 11 132 
Germany Spiegel 45 450 
Germany Weltde 130 308 
Austria der Standard 62 2587 
Austria die Presse 16 43 
France Le Figaro 24 3378 
France Le Monde 28 556 
Poland Dziennik 13 20 
Poland Interia 45 1160 
 
  
The Visibility and Communication of cohesion policy in Online Media 
 
31 
In some cases, it was possible to gather data from the largest news organisations of a country, such as 
France, Spain and the UK. In other cases, it was a TV portal (Germany) or a web portal (Poland) that were 
crawled for comments. In some others cases, such as Italy and Poland, only smaller circulation news 
media had a sufficient volume of stories for calculating reliable averages. 
Table 4 shows for each news site the maximum number of comments generated for a cohesion policy 
story. Some news sites, typically very popular ones, can have very lively comments. Only in the case of 
Germany was the maximum number of comments less than 500. In all other cases at least one site 
crossed that threshold and for some sites by quite a margin. 
The average comments per story is also indicative of how cohesion policy stories generate 
commentary. It is important to note that the average number of comments in only for the cohesion 
policy stories that were collected and not the average for the site as a whole. It is highly likely that for 
some country cases other issue areas generate more average comments per story. For the sample of 
stories collected the average level of commentary appears to be rather high. Only in one case, Spain’s 
El Mundo, is the rate lower than 10. Indeed, for some countries such as Germany and the UK the rate is 
high. 
To illustrate some of the issues that are actively discussed by readers, Table 5 looks at the top two stories 
per media site. For Austria and Germany, the salient topics are related to conditionality, the migration 
crisis and Greek financial crisis. The migration issue is also important in Spain. In the French press it is 
stories about Polish workers and legal reform in the country, while in Italy issues related to employment 
are also important. All high commentary Polish stories are about political clashes over funds, while for 
the UK all stories are related to Brexit. 
Many of the high commentary stories are about broader EU politics rather than specifically about 
cohesion policy. Such stories tend to be about problems and conflicts. To evaluate the overall tone 
across the stories, sentiment analysis was performed. Figure 21 shows the results of sentiment analysis 
performed on the corpus of comments grouped by media source. As expected, online commentary is 
generally highly expressive and polarising. The large amount of negative tone is not unsurprising given 
the sources. It should be noted that this does not mean the cohesion policy relevant aspects of the 
stories are perceived negatively since a story might be about a crisis event but the cohesion policy issue 
is portrayed positively. Instead, Figure 21 should be seen as an example of lively, but polarising debate 
among the citizenry. As revealed in the previous topic modeling section, when narrowing the focus to 
actual cohesion policy relevant sentences the tone tended to be overwhelmingly positive. 
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Table 5:  Examples of stories with maximum comments 
Country Site #Comments Main issue 
AT derstandard 2587 Migration/Conditionality 
AT derstandard 629 Asylum/Migration 
AT diepresse 43 EU subsidy for Croatia 
AT diepresse 37 Hungary clash over conditionality/migration 
DE spiegel 450 Greece crisis 
DE spiegel 447 Brexit 
DE weltde 308 EU funding for refugees 
DE weltde 278 Frontex border control 
ES elpais 1136 Domestic politics and EU funds 
ES elpais 1133 Germany and migrant quotas 
ES elmundo 515 Domestic politics and regional politics 
ES elmundo 32 Migration crisis and lack of EU response 
FR lefigaro 3378 France-Poland clash on relocated workers 
FR lefigaro 963 EU battle with Poland over legal reforms 
FR lemonde 556 France-Poland clash on relocated workers 
FR lemonde 313 Macron's plan for the future of the EU 
IT ilfattoquotidiano 504 Domestic regional politics 
IT ilfattoquotidiano 215 Citizenship and employment rights 
IT ilgiornale 132 EU and employment rights for immigrants 
IT ilgiornale 93 Italian government vs EU Commission 
PO interia 1160 Poland losses in Structural Fund allocation 
PO interia 922 Battle over EU funds 
PO dziennik 20 Government battle over EU budget 
PO dziennik 20 EU cuts for Poland 
UK guardian 4637 Breixt and National Health Service 
UK guardian 4603 Brexit and living standards 
UK dailymail 1559 UK divorce bill 
UK dailymail 732 Brexit and Nigel Farage 
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Figure 21:  Sentiment scores per country source 
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4. SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Facebook (FB) posts on cohesion policy constitute a small share of overall FB posts by EU 
institutional actors, parties and interest groups. The majority of analysed FB posts (almost 60 
percent) are by DG REGIO (Europe in my Region), followed (a long way behind) by the CPMR 
and Commissioner for Regional Policy. Among political parties, the Greens dominate in using 
FB. 
 
• Most FB posts are neutral in tone, providing factual information, although DG REGIO posts 
generally contain more positive sentiment. 
 
• Twitter visibility is relatively low among EP candidates. Around 15 percent of EP election 
candidates with a Twitter account tweeted about cohesion policy during the period January-
June 2019, on average 3 times and in generally positive terms.  
 
• The largest number of tweets were again by DG REGIO followed by EU influencers (typically 
journalists, EU officials and academics) and interest groups representing regional/local actors. 
The tone was overwhelmingly positive, significantly more so than for the EP candidates 
  
 
4.1 Facebook 
The visibility of cohesion policy in social media is analysed through Facebook and Twitter platforms, 
the most popular social networks. Crucially, both platforms provide certain features (likes, shares, 
retweets, etc.) that allow for quantitative analysis of the volume and potential audience of social media 
activity. This first section provides analysis of Facebook media coverage of cohesion policy. To 
understand the scope of Facebook media being posted and the discussions generated, data was 
collected from the public pages of all EU institutions, bodies and prominent cohesion policy 
stakeholders/interest groups. The data include comments, reactions and users, as well as post 
characteristics (timing, type and length). The following analysis evaluates FB posts on cohesion policy 
in terms of visibility, reactions, the topics and tone of posts, and the determinants of engagement. 
Visibility 
The visibility of Facebook activity on cohesion policy can be measured by comparing the volume of FB 
posts by EU actors relative to cohesion policy relevant posts. Figure 22 below shows the distribution of 
Facebook posts grouped by actor. The first plot relates to all Facebook post. The figure includes the list 
of all Facebook pages that were crawled for the analysis. A total number of 11,285 Facebook posts were 
analysed. Note the actual number of Facebook posts crawled was higher, however, the analysis focused 
on the period since 2013. As shown in the second plot in Figure 22  only a subset of these Facebook 
posts were identified as relevant to cohesion policy based on a keyword content search. The number 
of relevant posts was 691 posts, which amounts to just over 6 percent.  
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Figure 22:  Number of Facebook posts by Actor 
 
The largest share of cohesion policy posts by far are generated by DG REGIO’s Europe in my 
region Facebook page (almost 60 percent of  the total), as can be seen in the second plot of Figure 22. 
It is worth noting that a number of interest group associations are also well represented, accounting 
collectively for just over one-fifth of the total. The EU institutions (Commission, Council and European 
Parliament) as well as other EU institutional actors and bodies are very poorly represented in the 
aggregate numbers. Due to the very low count of posts for many EU institutional actors (EIB, ECA, EP, 
Council of Ministers), these organisations will be grouped together for some of the analyses conducted 
below. 
Figure 23 shows the evolution of Facebook post activity over time.  An upward trajectory for the 
number of Facebook posts per year is evident, but much less clear for cohesion policy relevant 
posts. In fact, the gap appears to be widening. In the year 2017 CP relevant Facebook posts accounted 
for approximately 13 percent of all posts. In 2018 that proportion had dropped marginally to 11 per 
cent, notwithstanding a significant increase in CP posts. By 2019, however, the proportion has dropped 
dramatically to approximately 5 percent of the total.  
The declining visibility of cohesion policy posts relative to all posts could potentially be explained by 
two factors. First, there was a significant increase in FB post activity in relation to general EU 
institutional issues in the run up to the European Parliament elections. Second, the period saw an 
increasing corporate focus on the ‘InvestEU’ media campaign. 
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Figure 23:  Facebook posts over time  
 
Engagement  
To assess the impact of FB posts, an analysis of engagement is undertaken. Engagement is a marketing 
term that captures the commitment and the way a follower interacts with a brand. The term is used in 
analysis of social networks such as Facebook to measure the degree of interaction between posts and 
users. Measuring the engagement of a post facilitates comparison across different posts with a simple 
and standardised metric. Thus, the “brand” is a single post, and those followers who can interact with 
the post are “users”. 
For this analysis, the engagement ratio of a given post is defined by the interactions with the post (i.e. 
comments, likes…) over the number of followers of the FB Page. It is important to note that not all 
interactions can be considered equally important for the calculation of engagement. In social networks, 
more impact is generated by commenting on a post than a simple “like” as there is a stronger level of 
two-way interaction. Therefore, the final formula for the calculation of engagement ratio is: 
 
where Num.Reactions includes the total number of ‘likes’, ‘love’, ‘ahah’, ‘grrr’, ‘wow’ and ‘sigh’ reactions. 
 
Figure 24 plots the average rate of engagement of all FB posts on cohesion policy by actor. It is clear 
that the posts with the highest engagement are by DG REGIO (‘EU in my region’), which accounts for 
13 of the top 15 posts - represented by purple dots with engagement values greater than 2.5. However, 
the box plots also show that other actors score higher engagement ratios on average across all of their 
posts. In particular, the interest groups CALRE, CPMR and AEBR have particularly high engagement 
rates. While the European Parliament has the highest engagement rate, it is important to note that it 
only has two cohesion policy posts under its corporate account and that the high score is accounted 
for by a single post. 
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Figure 24:  Engagement with FB content posted by EU actors  
 
 
To provide an illustration of the topics covered in the most popular posts, Table 6 provides a subset of 
the top 15 posts and their content as well as the total number of reactions, likes and engagement 
scores. As noted, 13 of the most engaging post are by DG REGIO, notably posts on quiz and blogging 
contests (ranked 1, 3, 7, 11, 12, 15) and targeting youngsters through a European ‘roadtrip’ event (5, 8, 
9, 10 14) and training on journalism (6). Posts on the RegioStars awards (2) and photo competition (4) 
also have high engagement.  
Aside from DG REGIO posts, only two of the most engaging 15 posts are by other EU actors. These 
include a post by the corporate account of the European Parliament on its report on the ESF+ 
Regulation for 2021-27; and a post by the AEBR interest group announcing a meeting of project 
beneficiaries, which has a much smaller number of reactions but high engagement relative to the 
number of followers (Table 6).   
The content of FB posts across a broader range of actors is provided in an Annex to this study, which 
includes the top-3 FB posts for all of the 14 EU actors/FB accounts covered by the analysis. This shows 
that a high number of the most engaging posts relate to cohesion policy reform (Council of Ministers, 
Commission, AEBR, CALRE, CoR, CPMR, EECS), events/seminars (AEBR, Commissioner Cretu, CoR, EECS, 
EIB), awareness raising about the policy or projects (AEBR, EECS, European Parliament, European 
Commission), prizes and competitions (AEBR, DG REGIO), training (ECA, Eurocities) and reports/studies 
(ECA).  
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Table 6:  Most popular cohesion policy posts in terms of engagement  
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Finally, to analyse the determinants of engagement with cohesion policy posts, a regression analysis 
was undertaken. The results of the OLS regression are shown in Table 7 revealing that engagement has 
been increasing over time and that posts with photos have higher levels of engagement. It also shows 
that the type of actor matters, with interest groups (e.g. AEBR, CPMR) most likely to generate high 
engagement. By contrast, the sentiment or length of posts is not associated with the level of 
engagement.  
 
Table 7:  Regression explaining engagement ratio 
 
Note: p<0.1*; p<0.05**; p<0.01*** 
DG Regio was the reference category for Type of actor; Story was the reference category for Post type. Unstandardised residuals are in 
brackets.  
 
Tone of posts 
To evaluate the tone of FB posts on cohesion policy, sentiment analysis was undertaken. Sentiment 
analysis is the task of automatically determining what feelings a user is expressing in a text. Although 
sentiment is often split as a binary distinction (positive or negative) it is worth noting that most 
sentences from texts are neutral because they do not express any opinion. We employ a sentiment 
lexicon approach to analyse the sentiment of texts by matching the FB posts with a list of pre-defined 
words associated with a specific sentiment value.  
The boxplot in  
Figure 25 shows the average level of sentiment for the different actors at the level of posts, i.e., where 
each dot represents a Facebook post. Positive numbers on the x axis (Average sentiment level) reflect 
a positive score while negative scores are indicative of negative sentiment. Since group comparisons 
are affected by the number of posts per groups when the number is low, the grouping is based on the 
four largest groups of actors:  
• Institution (Council of Ministers, Commission, European Parliament) 
• Other institution (EIB, ECA, EECS, CoR, ECSC) 
• DG REGIO  
• Interest group (AEBR, AER, CALRE, CPMR, EUROCITIES)  
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The boxplots show that the groups, notably DG REGIO, have a large range with some very positive 
stories. In all cases, the mean level of sentiment is well above the dashed 0 line and in the positive side 
of the spectrum. Unlike the positive end of the spectrum, there are no posts that are clearly in the 
negative territory, i.e., below -0.5. Indeed, none of the posts cross the 0.3 threshold. What this suggests 
is that by and large most stories are rather neutral albeit with a significant number in the case of DG 
REGIO in the very positive side. Illustrative examples of FB posts with positive and negative tone are 
provided in Table 8. 
 
Figure 25  Sentiment analysis grouped by type of actor 
 
 
 
Table 8:  Examples of FB posts with positive and negative sentiment 
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4.2 Twitter 
The second social media channel investigated is Twitter. The first step of the research involved altering 
the key terms list to include shorter terms related to cohesion Policy that are used on Twitter, such as 
hashtags (e.g. #CohesionPolicy), as well as acronyms for the key funds (ERDF, ESF, ESIF) in all European 
languages. These short acronyms, rather than the full name of the funding instrument, are more likely 
to be used given Twitter’s text character restrictions. The key terms were used to make a Twitter 
historical search for the period January to June 2019. This returned approximately 3 million tweets 
posted after filtering out non-EU languages. This ‘base’ dataset constitutes the universe of ‘potentially’ 
relevant Tweets for the period under investigation. Evidently, a significant proportion of the 3 million 
Tweets in the base dataset are likely to be non-relevant since the key terms can have different 
meanings, especially in different languages (e.g. the ERDF acronym in Spanish, FEDER, also refers to a 
medical association). Furthermore, this dataset contains tweets and retweets. 
The second step was to identify relevant Tweets based on account names. To this end, a database of all 
the candidates competing for the European Parliament elections of 2019 was created. In addition, a list 
of Twitter accounts for the EU institutions and organisations, as well as the top 40 EU influencers on 
Twitter in 2017 and 2018 (based on a list compiled by Euractiv.com), was created. The Twitter accounts 
of EP candidates, EU institutional actors and organisations as well the top EU influencers was then 
matched to the base dataset.  
 
Distribution of cohesion policy twitter activity across actors 
The analysis of candidates competing for the EP elections of 2019 identified a total of 8,055 candidates. 
Just over 38 percent of these candidates (3,099 individuals) had identifiable Twitter accounts. It was 
found that 1,292 cohesion policy tweets (including retweets) were made by the candidates. Since 
candidates frequently tweeted more than once, the actual count of candidates was a fraction of the 
total number of tweets. A total of 468 candidates were found to have tweeted at least once using a 
cohesion policy relevant term. This amounts to approximately 15 percent of candidates that competed 
in the EP elections and had a Twitter account, included a mention to cohesion policy in a tweet or a 
retweet. The relative small proportion of candidates tweeting about cohesion policy can be seen in 
Figure 26 depicted in yellow. 
 
Figure 26:  Proportion of candidates by grouping 
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Looking at the actual number of cohesion policy tweets or retweets per candidate shows that the 
volume is small. As illustrated in Figure 27, the count of tweets per candidate, where the dashed vertical 
line represents the mean, was just below 3 tweets. A few outlier candidates tweeted quite actively on 
cohesion policy with more than 10 identified tweets/retweets. 
Figure 27:  Cohesion policy tweets/retweets by candidates competing in the EP elections 2019 
 
 
Moving on to the analysis of EU institutional actors, interest groups and influencers, a total of 1,159 
tweets on cohesion policy were identified. DG REGIO produced the largest number of cohesion 
policy tweets with a total of 571 over the five-month period analysed (Figure 28). EU influencers 
(typically journalists, EU officials and academics) were also active with 179 tweets/retweets, followed 
by interest groups representing regional/local actors (145 tweets). 
 
Figure 28:  Number of tweets/retweets per actor 
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Engagement and reach 
To conduct a more in-depth analysis of the engagement and reach of Twitter discussion, and to expand 
the range of users beyond the Brussels bubble of elite actors, a second dataset was created. It used 
unambiguous keywords (such as “European Social Fund”. “European Regional Development Fund”, “EU 
cohesion policy”) as well as directly relevant hashtags (such as #euinmyregion) drawing on all EU 
languages. Combining step one, the Tweets identified in the base dataset from elite actor accounts 
(candidates, institutional actors and influencers), with the new targeted keyword search in step two, 
yielded a dataset of approximately 45,000 Tweets for the five month period in question. Crucially, this 
new dataset of relevant tweets contains ordinary users as well organisations such as media outlets.  
It should be noted that as with most Twitter datasets, the overwhelming majority of tweets are retweets 
rather than original tweets. To measure the impact of tweets, the original tweet was identified along 
with the impact in terms of diffusion and engagement. From the 45,000 tweet/retweet dataset, a total 
of 4,895 original tweets were identified. The rest of the analysis focuses on this original tweets dataset.  
The analysis of the language distribution of cohesion policy tweets reveals that English is the 
most popular language, accounting for more than half of all tweets (Figure 29). This is followed by 
Spanish and Italian, representing 13.7 percent and 13.2 percent respectively. 
Figure 29:  Original tweets by language 
 
 
To distinguish between the different actors generating tweets we use a three-fold category:  
(1) Candidates: for the EP elections of 2019  
(2) Institutions: a wider category including EU institutions, territorial interest groups  and EU 
influencers  
(3) Other: all actors that were not specifically identified in categories 1 and 2. This group is mostly 
composed of ordinary citizens and organisations, such as media outlets as well as 
national/regional level stakeholders (including Managing Authorities and politicians that were 
not candidates in the EP elections). 
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Temporal dynamics 
The evolution of Twitter activity does not reveal a pronounced change over time, as shown by the 
rather flat regression line in the first panel of Figure 30. However, there are some noticeable peaks in 
Twitter activity.  
The first peak in Twitter activity on 4 March 2019 is Brexit related. It was provoked by the UK 
government’s announcement of a ‘Stronger Towns Fund’ for the post-Brexit period. Much of the 
Twitter discussion was highly critical of the announcement arguing that the fund was being used to 
buy political support for Theresa May’s Withdrawal Agreement deal among opposition/Labour party 
Members of Parliament, and that the proposed £1.6 billion fund was in any case much lower than the 
£10 billion allocation by the EU through cohesion policy in 2014-20.  
The second key peak on 9 May 2019 was ‘Europe day’, which corresponds with an EU-wide 
communication campaign by the Commission and managing authorities to publicise EU co-funded 
projects through events and by encouraging citizens to visit projects that are opened up to the public.  
Figure 30:  Distribution of original tweets over time, January-June 2019 
 
Engagement and reach 
Retweets provide a useful indicator of twitter engagement. Figure 31 shows the overall retweet 
count per actor category. As can be seen in the first panel of the figure, among the ‘Other’ category 
there are some noticeable outlier Tweets on cohesion policy that have had generated a high volume 
of retweets. Closer inspection reveals that some of these Tweets at the high end are Brexit-related 
tweets. 
Figure 31:  Retweet count of original tweets  
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The second panel in Figure 31 estimates the average retweet count per group. The average is 
somewhat higher for the EP Candidate grouping. Both the EP Candidate and EU institutional categories 
have a significantly higher average retweet impact than the Other category. This is not surprising since 
the EP Candidate and EU Institutional categories are mainly composed of elite actors, while the other 
category contains ordinary citizens (as well as policy stakeholders, including managing authorities). 
 
To further explore the engagement and reach of cohesion policy tweets, two metrics were created: (1) 
Engagement Index and (2) Potential Reach. The Engagement Index measures the level of 
engagement/commitment generated by a specific, original tweet. The index takes into account all the 
interactions that the content of a tweet has attracted as a proportion of the total number of followers. 
The Engagement Index takes account of different levels of commitment of Twitter interactions through 
the following weighting scores: Likes (weight=1), Retweets (weight=2) and Quotes and Replies 
(weight=3). It is formally defined as follows: 
 
Engagementindex = 
(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹∗1)+(𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹∗2)+(𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹∗3)+(𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗3)
𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁.𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  * 100 
 
This type of metric is most appropriate for analysing tweet engagement from accounts with similar 
numbers of followers. However, it is instructive to see the distribution of engagement grouped by 
category. As can be can be seen in the first panel of Figure 32, the “Other” category attracts greater 
engagement. However, this effect is driven by the relatively low numbers of followers on average within 
this category. This can be seen in the second panel in Figure 7 where the average number of followers 
per category are shown. The institutional accounts have the highest follower count. 
 
Figure 32: Average level of engagement and followers by group 
 
 
This suggests that Tweets from EU institutional actors are not especially engaging, in terms of 
interaction levels from other users, when controlling for the number of followers. An illustration can be 
seen in Figure 33, which shows the engagement ratio by follower count with some examples of outlier 
cases from each of the three groups. Amongst the EP candidates, the MEP Marine Le Pen has by far the 
largest number of followers. Further inspection reveals that this MEP posted one original cohesion 
policy tweet during the period under study that generated a relatively high number of retweets (26), 
which constitute a very small proportion of her follower count. Not surprisingly, among the EU 
institutional groups, it is the European Commission and the European Parliament with the highest 
following by some degree.  
 
Figure 33: Engagement index by follower count  
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The ‘Other’ grouping includes some media organisations (e.g. the Spanish and German organisations 
20minutos.es and ZIET online) that have very high follower counts, but did not generate any significant 
engagement – when measured in relative terms to their follower count. On the other hand, some 
Tweets by ordinary citizens can generate high levels of engagement, as shown by the two annotated 
tweets in Figure 33. . The two tweet examples depicted were either directly or indirectly related to 
Brexit and the loss of Structural Funds. These tweets generated high levels of engagement as measured 
by the index or by an even more straightforward measure - the number of retweets which was over 
1000.  
 
The Potential Reach index measures the maximum diffusion of a tweet within the social network. It is 
associated to the number of “viewers” (users) of the content. For this study, the Potential Reach index 
has been defined as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 +  � 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛=𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈
𝐹𝐹=1
 
 
 
where Num.Followers_user is the number of followers of the user while  
 
 
� 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛=𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈
𝐹𝐹=1
(𝑃𝑃) 
 
is related to the number of followers of those users who have retweeted the tweet, thereby increasing 
the diffusion of the content. 
It is important to note that the Potential Reach index focuses on the upper limits of diffusion while the 
final reach of a tweet is expected to be lower than this limit.  
Figure 34 shows that the EU institutions actors category has the highest average potential reach, while 
the wide confidence bars for the EP Candidate category indicates high variability among candidates in 
terms of their potential reach. 
Figure 34: Potential reach index by actor group 
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Tone of tweets 
Sentiment analysis was performed on the tweets to assess the tone of cohesion policy discussions. As 
can be seen in Figure 35, the average sentiment polarity is in the positive range. This is particularly the 
case for the EU institutional actor category, and to a slightly lesser degree for the EP candidate tweets. 
The ‘other’ category, on the other hand, has more polarization in terms of positive and negative tone.   
 
Figure 35:  Sentiment polarity by actor group 
 
 
 
Determinants of twitter engagement 
To explore the determinants of the diffusion of Twitter media content on cohesion policy, a statistical 
regression analysis was undertaken of the volume of tweets’ retweets and favourites. The engagement 
and potential reach indices could not be used because the data was highly skewed. The results of the 
regression analysis are presented in Table 9. Whether the outcome is the Retweet count or the 
Favourite count, the significant factors remain the same in both models. EP Candidates and Institutions 
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(relative to the ‘other’ actor category) are both positively associated with higher retweet and favourite 
counts.  
Higher sentiment scores (more positive content) is associated with lower diffusion rates, which could 
be indicative of more polarizing content generating higher retweet and favourite counts. Finally, an 
indicator variable was created for the campaign period of the EP election, where Yes indicates the six-
week period leading up to the EP election at the end of May 2019. Here we find a negative association, 
indicating that tweets from the pre-election campaign period were more likely to have higher diffusion.  
 
Table 9:  Regression of retweets and favourites 
 Reetweet              
count 
 Favourites                                 
count 
Actor (base = other)    
   EP candidate 0.689***  0.879*** 
         (0.032) 
 
           (0.023) 
   Institution 0.622***  0.844*** 
         (0.017) 
 
           (0.012) 
Sentiment -1.325***  -1.097*** 
         (0.032) 
 
           (0.025) 
Word length 0.042***  0.049*** 
         (0.001) 
 
          (0.001) 
Campaign period: Yes -0.406***  -0.313*** 
         (0.013) 
 
           (0.001) 
Constant 0.463***  0.566*** 
         (0.028) 
 
           (0.023) 
Observations 4,895  4,895 
Log Likelihood -48,667  -88,178 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 97,346  176,368 
Note: Poisson regression. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; p *** < 0.01;  
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5. EU PRESS RELEASES 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Cohesion policy visibility in institutional press activity is relatively low. For EU 
institutions, press releases have been a major channel of communication, with 13,000 
issued over the 2013-19 period – some 5,000 from the EU institutions and 8,000 from 
political parties. The proportion of cohesion policy press releases is very low and 
averages just 30 per year. 
 
• Cohesion policy is more visible in the press release activity of the European 
Commission, constituting 4 percent of press releases. It features not just in press 
releases about the policy itself, especially with reference to regions, but in releases on 
the EU budget and EU investment activity.  
 
• EU institutional press releases tend to focus on socio-economic issues, whereas the 
European Parliament’s political parties are more likely to frame their releases in terms 
of power issues (institutional bargaining, empowerment, conditionality etc.). 
 
• EU press releases do have some traction on social media, although representing a 
very small proportion of all tweets relating to cohesion policy, and they are mainly 
diffused by EU institutions and stakeholders rather than the public 
 
 
EU Press releases are official statements delivered to the news media with the aim of providing 
information or making an announcement. This section analyses the volume and visibility of cohesion 
policy press releases over time and compares the distribution of activity across EU institutions and 
political parties. It also examines the content  of cohesion policy press releases through a comparison 
of the semantic and syntactic content across different policy domains, and through in-depth qualitative 
framing analysis. 
5.1 Institutional and policy visibility  
The total number of press releases crawled during the period covering the EP legislature of 2014 to 
2019 was just under 13,000. This corpus of data was then divided into two groups, the main EU 
institutions (the Commission, Council and Parliament) and the different political party groups (e.g. the 
S&D and EPP). Approximately 5,000 press releases came from EU institutions while just over 8,000 were 
generated by the political party groups.   
The distribution of press releases over time are shown in Figure 36 distinguishing those on cohesion 
policy from other all other EU policy domains. There is clearly an upward trend in the number of press 
releases. The drop in the number for the year 2019 is due to the fact that the data collection was for the 
first half of the year. The proportion of cohesion policy relevant press releases is very small. At 207 
relevant press releases, the number of cohesion policy related press releases appears to be rather low, 
accounting for just over 1.5 percent of total press releases.  
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Figure 36:  Press releases over time 
 
 
Figure 37 shows the proportion of cohesion policy press releases by source (on the y-axis) and grouped 
by type of actor. In breaking down press release activity by type of actor it is possible to see that among 
the EP party groups most attention is devoted to cohesion policy by the two main EP family groups, 
the S&D and the EPP.   
 
Figure 37:  Proportion of cohesion policy press releases by actor (percent) 
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In terms of the EU institutions, cohesion policy is less visible as a proportion of total institutional press 
activity. This is particularly the case for the European Parliament and, to a somewhat lesser degree, for 
the Council. In both cases, cohesion policy press releases account for less than 1 percent of total 
activity. In short, the visibility of cohesion policy as represented in the press release activity of two of 
the main EU institutions is markedly low. 
Cohesion policy is much more visible in the press release activity of the Commission, constituting 
approximately 4 percent of press release activity. Although this proportion may appear small at first 
sight it is important to note that, as with the other EU institutions, the Commission deals with many 
policy domains. What matters most for visibility is whether the level of observed Cohesion press 
release activity is below the expected proportion given the fact that Commission attention also needs 
to be devoted to other policy domains. Specifically, Commission press releases cover 28 different 
policy domains according to its own classification system. To investigate whether there are significant 
deviations from the expected proportions of press releases across policy domains, a chi square test is 
applied. Figure 38 below shows the results of this test. 
 
Figure 38:  Deviations by policy theme (observed vs. expected)  
 
By inspecting the standardised residuals of the chi square test, it is possible to see in which policy 
domains deviate significantly from the expected distribution. The policy domains shaded in green are 
within the expected range, which includes cohesion policy alongside other policy domains such as the 
Environment and the Single Market. In other words, cohesion policy is fairly represented.  
The EU policy domains that are significantly below the expected distribution include areas such as the 
Security Union, the Budget and Research and Innovation. On the other hand, Competition policy, in 
particular, is the most visible in terms of the Commission's press release activity.  
The Commission's corpus of press releases provides scope for further analyses of the substantive 
content. To compare the semantic and syntactic content of the press releases across different policy 
domains, computational text analysis techniques (text vectorization and word embeddings) are 
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applied. The results are projected onto a two-dimensional plot depicting the centroids for each policy 
domain (Figure 39). Distances between the centroids of each policy domain are calculated to see which 
policy domains are closest in terms of content.   
Figure 39:  Similarity of press release content across policy domains  
 
 
 
The first plot shows that the centroid for cohesion policy appears to be close to some specific policy 
domains, such as the Budget and much further away to others such as Tax/Customs. In the second plot, 
press releases content across the different policy domains is ranked in terms of how close it is to 
cohesion policy.  
The results are intuitive. Cohesion policy is close to the EU budget because it represents, along with the 
CAP, the largest budget heading of the MFF. Cohesion policy is also closely connected to RTDI policy 
through the prioritisation of funding to ‘Thematic Objective 1 - Strengthening research, technological 
development and innovation’ underpinned by smart specialisation strategies. Similarly, tackling 
climate change, promoting a low-carbon economy and employment are core objectives. Lastly, the 
close links to the EMU and Financial policy domains reflect the increasing use of macro-economic 
conditionality in cohesion policy and its alignment with the European semester process. 
To provide a visualisation of the word frequency in the press releases, a word cloud has been generated 
(Figure 40).  This shows the most important words in the Commission’s press releases include ‘regions’ 
‘investment’ and ‘fund’.  
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Figure 40:  Word cloud of Commission Press releases on cohesion policy 
 
 
 
5.2 Framing analysis of visibility and content 
The cohesion policy press releases are analysed in more depth through qualitative framing analysis. 
The same framing matrix used in the online news media is applied to see how cohesion policy is 
represented in the press releases, as well as the importance or visibility of cohesion policy within the 
press releases. As with the analysis above, it is most appropriate to make group comparisons at the 
level of type of actor.  
Figure 41 illustrates how visible cohesion policy is as an issue within each press release. The scale varies 
from low visibility, where cohesion policy is only mentioned once or is an unimportant aspect of the 
story, through to high visibility where cohesion policy is the central topic of the story. There is little 
variation across the three levels of visibility for the press releases by EU institutional actors. On the other 
hand, for the political party groups cohesion policy appears to be a much more prominent feature of 
the story with high visibility for nearly half the press releases analysed. 
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Figure 41:  Visibility of cohesion policy in press releases by type of actor 
 
 
Turning to the specific frames and how cohesion policy is represented in the press releases, Figure 41 
shows the distribution of policy frames. The four policy frames and corresponding subframes are:  
• Socio-economic consequences: 1) job creation 2) social justice 3) social awareness/inclusion 
4) economic development 5) research and innovation 6) tackling brain drain 7) public services 
8) infrastructure 9) environment 10) cultural heritage 11) cultural development 12) civic 
participation 13) territorial cooperation 14) ineffective in achieving goals 
• Values: 15) solidarity 16) financial burden 
• Governance: 17) improving governance 18) bureaucracy and delays 19) mismanagement 20) 
fraud and corruption 21) poor communication   
• Power: 22) empowerment 23) lose sovereignty 24) conditionality 25) institutional bargaining 
over funding 26) political capital/interests 
The analysis shows that EU institutions’ press releases are much more likely to focus on the socio-
economic consequences policy frame than the political party press releases. On the other hand, 
political parties are much more likely to emphasise the ‘power’ policy frame, which is comparatively 
under-emphasised by the EU institutions.  
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Figure 42: Distribution of policy frames 
 
A more fine-grained analysis of the dominant subframes in Table 10 shows that ‘institutional 
bargaining over funding’ is the dominant focus of EP press releases within the ‘power’ frame, 
representing 38 percent of the total number of subframes. The press releases in this subframe are often 
critical of the inadequate level of cohesion policy funding and proposed cuts in the context of MFF 
negotiations. Economic development (9.2 percent) and social justice (8.2 percent) policy frames also 
feature highly in the press releases. The subframes with the most negative tone related to 
conditionality, mismanagement and spending delays, all of which appear in the middle of the 
distribution.  
By contrast, the dominant subframes in EU institutional press releases are economic development and 
infrastructure, each of which account for 19 percent of the total. The ‘improving governance’ policy 
frame also represent a significant share (16.7 percent), mainly reviewing EU efforts to reduce 
bureaucracy, irregularities and fraud and framed in positive way. By contrast, the subframe with the 
most negative tone on mismanagement is the least frequent subframe to appear in the EU institutional 
press releases. 
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Table 10:  Subframes in press releases by EU institutions and EP parties  
EU institutions’ Subframes %  EP Political Party Subframes % 
Economic development 19.0  Institutional bargaining over funding 37.9 
Infrastructure 19.0  Economic development 9.2 
Improving governance 16.7  Social justice 8.0 
Territorial cooperation 11.9  Environment/green/low-carbon 5.7 
Institutional bargaining over funding 10.7  Improving governance 5.7 
Research & innovation 8.3   Jobs 5.7 
Solidarity to poor countries/regions 6.0  Conditionality 5.7 
Environment/green/low-carbon 2.4  Solidarity to poor countries/regions 4.6 
Social awareness/inclusion 2.4  Bureaucracy and/or delays 3.4 
Cultural heritage 1.2 Mismanagement 3.4 
Jobs 1.2  Social inclusion 3.4 
Mismanagement 1.2  Infrastructure 2.3 
   Empowerment of institutions 1.1 
 Poor communication of funding/rules 1.1 
 Research & innovation 1.1 
 Territorial cooperation 1.1 
 
 
5.3 Social media impact 
To assess the reactions to EU press releases in social media, a search was undertaken of the Twitter 
dataset for links to EU press releases over the 5 month period January-June 2019. This led to the 
identification of 23 tweets in which an EU press release was quoted and included as a link. These tweets 
were retweeted 126 times and liked (favourites) 175 times. Given that EU institutions issue around 40-
50 press releases a year on cohesion policy, this indicates that the press releases do have some traction 
on social media, although this represents a very small proportion of the 45,000 tweet/retweets on 
cohesion policy in this period.  
Analysis of the twitter accounts of the 23 tweets of EU press releases shows that they were virtually all 
EU or national institutions and policy stakeholders (including 4 EP candidates) with the exception of 
one citizen and one academic.  The top-5 press release topics in terms of retweets covered the reform 
of the ESF (three tweets); a European Parliament debate on the themes of work-life balance Brexit and 
natural gas; and a final tweet on rule of law conditionality 
A more robust analysis of the relative visibility of cohesion policy compared to the other press releases 
of EU policy areas would provide further insights, but would require the generation of a much larger 
dataset for other EU policies which is beyond the scope of this study.   
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6. IMPROVING COHESION POLICY VISIBILITY & COMMUNICATION  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The political priority placed on improving the visibility of cohesion policy by EU 
institutions has increased in recent years. Commission reform proposals aim to 
integrate communication into programming, ensure more consistent branding, and 
improve the dissemination of the results of strategic projects. The Commission has 
also taken steps to tackle misinformation and improve EU-level communication and 
cooperation with media organisations.  
 
• A more sophisticated and strategic approach to media communication is 
needed, particularly the use of social media, underpinned by digital media strategies 
at EU, national and subnational levels. 
 
• Effective citizen engagement is a crucial pre-requisite to raise the visibility of 
cohesion policy in online media. This would provide a foundation – and the 
feedstock – for much more citizen-focused communication, focusing on issues that 
matter directly to citizens, engaging in more substantive dialogues with citizens and 
providing opportunities to exploit multipliers.  
 
• Participatory budgeting should be encouraged in 2021-27 through pilot 
initiatives under ‘PO5 - A European Closer to Citizens’. As the direct 
representatives of European citizens, the European Parliament should be bold and 
strive to ensure that the public have a say on what is funded in their local area by one 
of the largest and most visible areas of EU expenditure impacting on their daily lives.  
 
 
 
6.1 Academic perspectives - COHESIFY Project 
Research into the visibility, content and consequences of online media coverage of cohesion policy 
and the EU more generally is underdeveloped. The COHESIFY project provides the first in-depth 
analyses of online media content with respect to policy narratives, thematic coverage and tone. 
Complementing the findings from this study, the framing analysis and text analysis of news stories on 
cohesion policy found that the key topics discussed in online news media mirror cohesion policy 
thematic objectives/priorities as well as broader EU political and policy themes.7 National media were 
more likely to discuss cohesion policy in connection with broader EU political themes such as the 
Eurozone and Migration crises, and EU budgetary politics related to conditionality and spending 
irregularities. Regional news was found to be more positive in tone and topic focus.  
                                                             
7 Mendez C, Mendez F, Triga V and Carrascosa J.M (In press, 2020) “EU cohesion policy in the Media Spotlight: Exploring 
territorial and temporal patterns in news coverage and tone” Journal of Common Market Studies; Triga, V. and 
Vadratsikas, K. (2017b) Framing of cohesion policy, COHESIFY Research Paper 9, http://www.cohesify.eu/research-papers/; 
Carrascosa, J.M., Mendez, C. and Triga, V. (2017) EU cohesion policy in the media: A computational text analysis of online 
news, user comments and social media, COHESIFY Research Paper 12: http://www.cohesify.eu/research-papers/ 
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The COHESIFY project also found that cohesion policy social media activity (Twitter and Facebook) in 
English and Spanish, was largely driven by political and policy events and was mainly disseminated and 
discussed by policy stakeholders and practitioners. Network analysis of the use of the #cohesionpolicy 
hashtag shows that EU institutions are the dominant actors, with strong networking between EU 
institutions (DG REGIO, the EP and the CoR) in Twitter usage.8 
The COHESIFY study also surveyed MEPs and European Commission staff views of cohesion policy 
communication, and conducted case study research in 17 EU regions based on documentary research, 
interviews, surveys and focus groups. European Commission staff in DG REGIO and DG EMPL perceived 
social media to be a popular but ineffectively used tool to promote cohesion policy visibility and public 
awareness.9 Further, a large majority of Commission staff consider that politicians and the media do 
not sufficiently acknowledge the EU role and contribution to regional development when discussing 
cohesion policy. By contrast, Commission staff considered local and regional media/newspapers to be 
the most effective tools for communicating cohesion policy. 
The MEPs surveyed considered that social media was one of the least used tools for communicating 
about cohesion policy, the main focus being on publications and information products and events, 
followed by cooperation with external multipliers. Further, only a quarter of MEPs considered that 
social media was used effectively to achieve communication objectives, even though the vast majority 
perceived social media to be the most effective tool for increasing citizen awareness, followed by local 
and regional newspapers. By contrast, the REGI committee’s use of social media was rated as being 
highly effective. 
At Member State level, the COHESIFY case study research reported several trends in relation to media 
usage by managing authorities and stakeholders in 2014-20.10 First, there is a greater strategic focus in 
communication strategies than previously, which are more oriented towards involving beneficiaries, 
the media and other multipliers in the dissemination of information to the general public. However, 
communication remains a second order priority relative to other management tasks and goals (such as 
spending, performance and compliance) in most cases owing to a lack of resources especially in small 
programmes. Second, there is an absence of proactive and direct engagement with media 
organisations, often restricted to exchanging press releases with a low level of frequency. Third, 
traditional media are perceived by surveyed stakeholders to mainly report negative news about 
cohesion policy (e.g. scandals and corruption) because it attracts more public attention.  
The COHESIFY study found evidence of increased social media usage but also widespread resistance to 
its use. There was recognition among policy stakeholders of the ineffective usage of social media for 
promoting programmes and projects and the need to increase social media usage because of the 
potentially significant impact in raising awareness of cohesion policy, funding opportunities and 
achievements.  
Research on the impact of cohesion policy on citizen attitudes shows that regions receiving greater EU 
funding allocations are more likely to identify with the EU.11 Independent of funding allocations, citizens’ 
awareness of EU Funds has a significant impact on the likelihood of an individual developing a sense of 
                                                             
8 Peters, M. (2018) Network Analysis of twitter #cohesionpolicy, Open Budgets blog, 1 September 2017.  
9 Corchado, L. Fernández, N. Martín, F and Mendez C (2017) Comparative analysis of cohesion policy communication 
strategies, COHESIFY Research Paper 11: http://www.cohesify.eu/research-papers/ 
10 Corchado, L. Fernández, N. Martín, F and Mendez C (2017) Comparative analysis of cohesion policy communication 
strategies, COHESIFY Research Paper 11: http://www.cohesify.eu/research-papers/ 
11  Borz, G. Brandenburg, H. and Mendez, C. (2017) The Impact of EU cohesion policy on European identity: Results from the 
COHESIFY citizen survey, COHESIFY Research Paper 14 http:/www.cohesify.eu/research-papers/ 
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European identity, when controlling for other relevant factors (e.g. EU funding levels, socio-
demographic and political factors). Having seen placards or banners publicising EU-funded projects 
also contributes to European identity, as does media consumption, especially if the media in the 
country of residence frames cohesion policy as a common (rather than national) project.12 
Public discussion about cohesion policy on online media is relatively low key. The COHESIFY project 
identified a very active community of users when analysing user-generated commentary in relation to 
online news in English and Spanish, but the user discussions rarely focused on EU cohesion policy 
directly.13 Sentiment analysis of user comments on news was mainly neutral or positive in the case of 
Spain compared to a much higher bias towards negative opinion in the UK.  The majority online 
discussion on the social media platforms Twitter and Facebook did not express opinions as they were 
mostly objective statements about, say, an event or a call. This was especially the case for Twitter. The 
largely neutral/positive sentiment associated with the social media sources analysed is not too 
surprising since the groups mainly comprised official channels or policy communities connected to 
cohesion policy. However, it also indicates that social media plays a limited role in raising the visibility 
of cohesion policy and connecting with citizens. Potential solution to address this disconnect are 
explored in the next section. 
 
6.2 Communication expert perspectives 
To provide a wider perspective on the challenges and potential lessons for improving EU cohesion 
policy visibility and citizen engagement, interviews were conducted with digital media and 
communication experts.14 The main recommendations were  
• Strategic approach. A more sophisticated and strategic approach to media communication is 
needed, particularly through social media, underpinned by coordinated digital media 
strategies at all levels (EU, national and subnational) with clear objectives and targets tailored 
to different groups. 
 
• Mobilise balanced participation. There is widespread recognition of the need to reach out 
beyond the ‘Brussels bubble’ to engage with wider audiences and avoid the tendency to 
‘preach to the converted’.  Reaching out to all socio-demographic segments of the population 
requires creative engagement, commitment and resources. Social media advertising can be an 
effective tool to target groups during media campaigns.  
 
• Cooperation with multipliers. Cooperating with influential social media users and bloggers 
is important to reach wider audiences. Blogs help to bridge the gap between social media and 
traditional media, especially in countries with low internet access and where the main source 
of information is TV or radio.  
 
                                                             
12 Borz et. al. (2018) op.cit. 
13 Carrascosa, J.M., Mendez, C. and Triga, V. (2017) EU cohesion policy in the media: A computational text analysis of online 
news, user comments and social media, COHESIFY Research Paper 12: http://www.cohesify.eu/research-papers/ 
14  The interviewers were conducted by telephone/skype with: Aleksandra Atanasova, Social Media consultant, Brussels; 
Anthony Zacharzewski, President of the Democratic Society, Brussels. Gauthier Bas, Managing Director, Old-Continent SPRL, 
Brussels; Laure Van Hauwaert, Managing Director, EU Institutions, WPP Government & Public Sector Practice, Brussels; 
Matteo Salvai, Information and Communication officer, Communication Unit, DG Regional and Urban Policy, European 
Commission; Francesco Molica, Information and Communication officer, Communication Unit, DG Regional and Urban 
Policy, European Commission; Mathew Lowry, Digital Media and Communication consultant, Brussels. 
IPOL | Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
62 
• Focus on issues that matter to citizens. Light social media content relating to citizens 
everyday lives is more popular with the public than institutional messages on policies. This also 
applies to citizen engagement through democratic innovations, which should involve 
discussion around issues that have been selected through a bottom-up approach to increase 
interest and ownership. However, targeted public participation requires increased provision 
and awareness of reliable information about policies. EU institutions could support these 
processes with high quality information in formats that can be localised so that people can 
understand the issues and what is being done to address them by different government levels 
(European, national, subnational) in their area.  
 
• Effective EU media campaigns require adequate planning, resources and competences. 
The resources dedicated to communication activities, especially at Member States level, are 
often low. Yet, effective media communication offers potentially large rewards in terms of 
shaping mainstream media coverage and as a consequence influencing the image of the EU.  
 
• Joined-up communication. Citizen engagement initiatives (e.g. events, citizen polls/juries 
etc.) should be joined up with policy conversations at EU level and localised. The Commission’s 
Citizen Dialogue approach, bringing senior officials or politicians to local towns and cities, 
provides a starting point that could be developed further. In particular, the outputs of these 
initiatives require common standards and clear objectives to feed results into EU policy-making 
debates effectively.  
 
• Continuous communication and engagement. When seeking opinions on EU policies and 
on media campaigns, feedback needs to be provided to participants, allowing people to follow 
up the discussion and feed in. Related, EU actors must be able to show how consultation 
processes have impacted decision-making to generate legitimacy and future engagement.  
 
Overall, a key message that permeated most of the expert interviews was the need for stronger 
citizen participation in a renewed debate about the EU’s democratic future. An authoritative analysis 
of the key challenges facing governments’ efforts to better connect with citizens in an age of 
technological and political disruption is The Leaders’ Report by WPP. Produced by WPP’s Government 
& Public Sector Practice, the Leaders’ Report is based on interviews and surveys conducted across 50 
countries and six multilateral organisations, with over 60 government communication leaders, 400 
government communicators and 8,000 citizens.  
The study shows that while governments want to engage with citizens and recognise the benefits of 
doing so, they are unsure about how best to devolve decision making to the public. A vital opportunity 
to rebuild trust with citizens is being missed because their input is not effectively included in policy-
making and most governments are not committed to implementing the results of citizen engagement 
activities. Among the main survey findings from government communicators are that: 
• Three quarters of respondents recognise that citizen engagement can create support for a 
policy and rebuild citizens’ trust in government; 
• However, a significant proportion (36 percent) think that citizens affected by a policy do not 
always get the opportunity to provide input and more than two thirds (77 percent) carry out 
engagement activities that deliberately minimise opportunities for citizen feedback; 
• more than half of the respondents (54 percent) lack the resources to effectively evaluate 
engagement programmes; and 
• only 8 percent consider that their organisation commits to act on public views before running 
a citizen engagement programme. 
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The core conclusion is that governments must rethink their citizen engagement strategies and create 
a meaningful connection with the people they serve by putting them at the heart of policy making in 
order to rebuild trust. Ten key drivers of citizen engagement – the ten c’s - that governments should 
adopt to rebuild trust with the public include:15  
• Core narrative: build and communicate a shared positive vision of the project.  
• Common good: Working for the benefit of the community rather than interest groups. 
• Cohesion: demonstrate equality and inclusion across communities, and a sense of unity within 
society. 
• Complexity: Ensure all audiences and different options and viewpoints are adequately 
considered. 
• Coherence: Maintain a consistent message and follow through with actions. 
• Communication: Provide citizens with the information they need in the right format on the 
right channels.  
• Cognitive system: Taking into account both emotional and rational influences on perception.   
• Capacitation: ensure citizens feel capable and empowered to contribute to the project.   
• Contribution: Involve citizens in designing the decision-making process. 
• Consideration: Rewarding and incentivising citizens for their involvement so that they feel 
valued by thanking them for input and providing them with results. 
Translating the WPP citizen engagement approach to the EU institutional context, Laure Van Hauwaert 
has provided ten tips for effective communication tailored to cohesion policy communication officers 
 
Source:  Van Hauwaert L (2018) Closing session at the meeting of the INFORM and INIO networks of EU 
cohesion policy communicators, 5-7 December 2018, Brussels, Belgium. 
                                                             
15 Kantar (2019) Activating the 10Cs of citizen engagement, May 2019. 
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Reviewing the weaknesses in the EU’s Future of Europe consultation, the digital media expert Mathew 
Lowry highlights five success criteria for promoting effective EU public participation:16 
• specific: participation processes focusing on a specific policy (circular economy, SME 
innovation support, etc), not something general and vague 
 
• transparent: processes where participants clearly see that they will be able to see if and how 
their contributions are taken on board 
 
• focused audience: processes addressed to people with enough Subject Matter Expertise to 
contribute meaningfully, even if they know nothing about the EU, rather than the ‘general 
public’ 
 
• resource credibility: processes where participants can see sufficient resources in place to 
process their contributions 
• institutional credibility: processes which extend an existing policy development process, rather 
than a one-off communications exercise 
 
Looking outside of the EU, a good practice example of citizen engagement (also highlighted in the 
Leaders Report) by an International Organisation is the World Bank’s ‘Strategic Framework for 
Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement.’ The framework was developed to systematically mainstream 
citizen engagement by including beneficiary feedback in supported projects.  
Box 1:  The World Bank’s ‘Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement’ 
The World Bank’s ‘Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement’ is guided by five 
principles: a results focus; engaging throughout the operational cycle; seeking to strengthen country 
systems; context-specific; and it is gradual. In practical terms, the World Bank’s citizen engagement 
mainstreaming commitment means that all Investment Project Financing operations financed with 
IBRD loans or IDA credits must meet three requirements: 
1. Project design must be citizen-oriented, i.e., having at least one mechanism to engage with 
beneficiaries in the specific context of the project; 
2. Projects’ results frameworks must include a beneficiary feedback indicator to monitor citizen 
engagement throughout project implementation; and    
3. Projects must report on the beneficiary feedback indicator by the third year of 
implementation 
 
To strengthen country systems for engaging with citizens, Development Policy Financing can 
facilitate the adoption of national legislation on participatory budgeting monitoring. Investment 
Project Financing operations can contribute to building effective feedback and recourse 
mechanisms to improve service delivery in specific sectors, or empower citizens at the local level to 
participate in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of development interventions. 
Source:  World Bank: https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do/brief/citizen-engagement 
 
                                                             
16 Mathew Lowry (2017) The limits of public participation in policy, medium.com. 
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In sum, the insights from communication experts and comparative experience across the world provide 
useful lessons for EU cohesion policy, which could lead to a new architecture of participation using 
democratic innovations to engage citizens in a modernised EU cohesion policy.   
 
6.3 EU institutional perspectives  
Improving communication and tackling bias 
The EU has taken a wide range of actions to tackle misinformation about the EU since 2015. The 
establishment of a task force, high-level groups and public consultations led to policy initiatives and 
actions plans to improve communication and tackle misinformation. A review of the implementation 
of these initiatives provided a positive assessment of the work carried out distinguishing four 
complementary strands of EU action:17  
• Strengthened EU capabilities to identify and counter disinformation, via the Strategic 
Communication Task Forces and the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell in the European External Action 
Service. It has also improved the coordinated response by setting up a Rapid Alert System to 
facilitate the exchange of information between Member States and the EU institutions.  
 
• Working with online platforms and industry through a voluntary Code of Practice on 
disinformation to increase transparency of political communications and prevent the 
manipulative use of their services to ensure users know why they see specific political content 
and ads, where they come from and who is behind them. 
 
• Awareness raising and improving societal resilience to disinformation, notably through 
more dissemination of fact-based messaging and renewed efforts to promote media literacy 
and better communication of EU policies. 
 
• Supporting Member State efforts to secure the integrity of elections and strengthen the 
resilience of the democratic systems. The establishment of election networks at EU and 
national level, with links to the Rapid Alert System, improved cooperation on potential threats. 
The ‘better communication on EU policies’ strand of the Commission’s awareness raising activities is of 
particular relevance to this study. The review highlights the Commission’s proactive and multilingual 
communication to millions of citizens to increase awareness and understanding of the impact of the 
EU on citizens’ daily lives through  
1) Social media. Commission communications on the topic of disinformation included 57 posts 
from January 2018 to April 2019 (across Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and LinkedIn), which 
generated 54,781 engagements and had an impact of 3,256, 476 impressions (Twitter and 
Facebook only) and 385,655 reach (Facebook and Instagram only) 
 
                                                             
17 European Commission (2018) Action Plan on disinformation: Commission contribution to the European Council of 13-14 
December 2018, Brussels, 5.12.2018; European Commission (2019) Report on the implementation of the Action Plan 
Against Disinformation, JOIN(2019) 12 final, 14.6.2019, Brussels: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=comnat:JOIN_2019_0012_FIN 
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2) Communication campaigns. A Europe that delivers (InvestEU, running in 16 Member states 
and reaching over 240 million potential contacts in 2017-2018 – see Box), a Europe that 
empowers (EUandME, targeting around 100 million 18-35 year-olds in the EU, and reaching 
over 60 million potential contacts in 2018-2019) and a Europe that protects (targeting 35-55 
year-olds, reaching close to 60 million potential contacts in 2018-2019)   
Public policy initiatives to tackle misinformation recommended by the European Commission 
include:18 
• enhance transparency of online news, involving an adequate and privacy-compliant sharing of 
data about the systems that enable their circulation online; 
• promote media and information literacy to counter disinformation and help users navigate the 
digital media environment; 
• develop tools for empowering users and journalists to tackle disinformation and foster a 
positive engagement with fast-evolving information technologies; 
• safeguard the diversity and sustainability of the European news media ecosystem, and 
• promote continued research on the impact of disinformation in Europe to evaluate the 
measures taken by different actors and constantly adjust the necessary responses; 
• Facilitating cooperation between independent fact checkers; 
• Harnessing new technologies such as artificial intelligence to tackle disinformation 
• Support to quality journalism via State Aid by Member States to the media sector. 
Box 2:  Evaluation of InvestEU campaign 
The evaluation of the InvestEU campaign provided a positive assessment of its relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency and added value.19 While the coherence of the campaign was also evaluated 
as strong, through central management by DG Communication, cooperation with other DGs and 
cohesion policy Managing Authorities was weaker. The sustainability of the campaign material was 
evaluated less positively and engagement with journalists was assessed as ineffective.  
A number of recommendations were made providing insights that are applicable to cohesion policy 
communication campaigns at EU level and within Member States. 
• Maintain a semi-decentralised approach with attention to pre-campaign research 
informing campaign design.  
• More attention to institutional coordination and integration of strategies and actions 
across actors involved in delivery, including better collaboration between the Commission 
Representations, the Europe Direct Information Centre and cohesion policy Managing 
Authorities  
• The importance of a centrally coordinated approach for data collection and analysis  
• Plan campaign sustainability from the outset while enforcing campaign efficiency through 
fine tuning  of campaign material, on-going evaluation, planning of microtargeting, and 
monitoring of social media saturation allowing for reprogramming; and 
• Increase the use of novel techniques to capture campaign effects on attitudinal change, 
such as text mining of press coverage (as employed in this study for the EP) and the 
qualitative analysis of online conversations. 
Source: Technopolis Group (2018). 
                                                             
18 European Commission (2018) Final report of the High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation, DG 
CONNECT, European Commission, Brussels. 
19 Technopolis Group (2018) Monitoring/Evaluation of the #InvestEU campaign Final Report of the study ‘Monitoring the 
performance of EC communication activities for the Investment Plan for Europe’, November 2018, Brussels. 
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For its part, DG REGIO is contributing to tackling misinformation in several ways.20 
1. Supporting the Spokesperson’s Service: Contributing to the EC Network against 
Disinformation, which has empowered the Commission DGs and the EEAS to respond to 
disinformation in their field of expertise - by issuing rebuttals and responding in a clear, up-to-
date and factual manner, fast and in many languages, especially the language of the lie 
2. Website: A webpage on the most common myths in cohesion policy has been published on 
the DG REGIO website with corresponding facts to challenge the myths as well as guidance on 
how to identify disinformation and to respond for managing authorities and other stakeholders  
3. Myth-busting social media campaign. An initiative currently being developed is a campaign 
to tackle myths on social media.  
While this study’s findings showed that bias only represents a very small share of the news frames 
underpinning cohesion policy stories in online media, the phenomenom of fake news is a growing 
international issue that merits attention by cohesion policymakers and managing authorities. 
 
The future of cohesion policy communication in 2021-27  
There has been a significant increase in the political priority by EU institutions on increasing the 
visibility of cohesion policy in recent years. Responding to requests from the Council  and European 
Parliament reports on the visibility  and future of cohesion policy , a joint Action Plan on 
Communication was presented by Commissioners Corina Creţu (DG REGIO) and Marianne Thyssen (DG 
EMPL) on 23 May 2017. The plan set out seven joint communication actions for cohesion policy at EU 
and national levels to be undertaken throughout 2017 emphasising the principle of shared 
responsibility and a strong reliance on existing tools for implementation, such as the 'EU in My Region' 
campaign, to minimise administrative cost and burden. More specifically, the seven actions were: 
• Launch of the Cohesion Alliance coalition of stakeholders, led by the Committee of the Regions 
and with a strong social media presence 
• A video competition on the achievements of cohesion policy organised at national level.  
• Publicity campaigns on iconic projects by national, regional or local authorities 
• Photo exhibitions on project achievements followed by public debates, launched by national, 
regional or local authorities 
• National project competitions following the Commission’s ‘Regiostars’ model 
• A campaign to celebrate the 60 years anniversary of the EU by national and EU authorities 
• Public debates in the regions with support from EU institutions and complementing the EU’s 
separate citizen dialogues. 
In parallel, DG REGIO launched additional campaigns involving local public debates, road trip 
campaigns targeting youngsters, a campaign targeting Member States with lower awareness of the 
policy, and grants to media organisations for dissemination of cohesion policy achievements.  
A Commission review of the implementation of the seven actions suggested an effective launch of 
the communication plan, albeit with varied take-up of measures.21 The Cohesion Alliance has proved 
to be very popular with a wide membership developing across Member States, regions and local 
                                                             
20  European Commission (2019) Summary of the Inform and INIO Networks Meeting of EU cohesion policy Communicators, 
15 -17 May 2018, Palermo, Italy; Rugina F (2019) INFORM and DG REGIO: Fighting Disinformation Together, European 
Commission, DG Regional Policy. 
21 European Commission (2018) Implementation of the Seven Joint Communication Actions, Progress report, European 
Commission, Brussels. 
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authorities. Actions that have been taken up quickly and effectively are the local and regional debates 
and the 'Did you know?' campaign. By contrast, the more resource intensive actions have been slower 
to take off namely the national version of the RegioStars awards and video competition. 
Alongside and related to the increased emphasis on upgrading communication, cohesion policy 
decision-making and reform debates have become more politicised with public opinion and media 
coverage playing a more important role in the policy process and reform agenda than previously, 
especially in relation to debates surrounding EU funding conditionality and the rule of law.22 Despite 
the generally positive tone of media coverage of cohesion policy, news stories on the topic of 
conditionality have increased in recent years and are largely negative in tone.23 Indeed, the 
Commission’s reluctance to suspend funding to Spain and Portugal in 2016, following non-compliance 
with EU fiscal and ESIF conditionality rules, was partly motivated by concerns about negative political 
backlashes in a context of deteriorating trust in the EU.24 
Set against this background, European Commission proposals for cohesion policy in 2021-2027 have 
upgraded the emphasis on communication, its evaluation and the use of social media outreach to 
publicise cohesion policy through requirements to: 
• integrate communication in the programming at the planning stage, include 
communication approach with objectives, target audiences, channels, budget and indicators;  
• establish a uniform branding of all EU Funds in which publicity material would be required 
to acknowledge EU co-funding. without a need to refer to individual Funds or instruments 
and their acronyms, to increase EU visibility and simplify policy jargon for the public;  
• place more emphasis on communicating the results of projects of ‘strategic importance’; 
• mandatory and frequent publication of list of operations and information on upcoming 
calls for proposals; and 
• more explicit provision on financial corrections in case beneficiaries do not comply with 
obligation  
There are two explicit references to social media in the post-2020 regulation:  
• Art 17.3 on the content of the programmes specifies that the MA shall provide a description of 
the social media outreach in its communication strategy (as noted, this will be a section of the 
programme and no longer a separate document); and 
• Art 45.1 sets out that the beneficiary shall acknowledge the support of the EU also by providing 
a description of the operation, including objectives and results, on beneficiary social media 
sites, where they exist. 
The European Parliament’s amendments to the Commission’s proposals include minor changes to 
the visibility, transparency and communication provisions, including a specification of the type of 
partners to be involved in communication activities, requiring timetables for project calls on MA 
websites and the names of contractors in the list of operations.25 Regarding beneficiaries, the EP 
proposes that information on EU support is displayed on both beneficiaries websites and social media 
                                                             
22 Bachtler, J. and Mendez C (In Press, 2020) Cohesion and the EU’s Budget: Is Conditionality Undermining Solidarity? in 
Ramona Coman, Amandine Crespy, Vivien Schmidt (eds.) Governance and politics in the post-crisis European Union, 
Cambridge University Press. 
23 Mendez et al. (2020) op.cit.; Triga (2017) op.cit. Carrascosa et al. (2017) op.cit. 
24 Bachtler and Mendez (2020) op.cit. 
25 Widuto, A. (2019) Better communication for cohesion policy, European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing, Members' 
Research Service PE 635.575, 14 March 2019. 
The Visibility and Communication of cohesion policy in Online Media 
 
69 
sites simultaneously, and calls for beneficiaries to "publicly and permanently" display Union symbols 
"clearly visible to the public" including permanent plaques and billboards.    
Like the EP, the European Committee of Regions (CoR) has also called for regional and local 
authorities to be specifically designated as partners involved in communication. Additional 
recommendations include:26 the possibility that the communication officer be responsible for several 
programmes; inclusion of CoR representation in the communication networks (INFORM-INIO); 
reinstating specific provisions on the communication strategy for one or several programmes; and for 
the montoring committee approval procedure to be outline din a new article.  
The Commission’s and the Committee of the Regions’ proposals are in line with the recommendations 
of academic studies. A more radical recommendation to boost the visibility of cohesion policy by the 
COHESIFY study was to introduce a more open and citizen focused-approach to programming 
involving experimentation with democratic innovations such as participatory budgeting and citizen 
panels/juries/polls. On the media front, the study recommended more proactive and engaging 
utilisation of social media with human interest stories by policymakers to resonate with citizens and 
provoke more active debate. It also called for territorially-targeted campaigns promoting positive 
narratives about the reality of cohesion policy achievements to challenge misinformed media stories. 
The PERCEIVE project also called for more engaging, creative and interactive social media activity and 
styles, alongside other channels and actions targeted to different groups and needs, as well as 
simplified language.27  
 
  
                                                             
26 Widuto (2019) Ibid. 
27 Barberio, V. Kuric, I, Hollerer, M. Mollona, E. and Pareschi, L. (2017a) Descriptive report on the specific role of new media in 
EU financed projects' communication strategies, Perceive, December 2017; Barberio, V. Kuric, I, Mollona, E. and Pareschi, L. 
(2017b) Qualitative report on the impact and effectiveness of communication strategies; Perceive, July 2017. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This study has examined the visibility and communication of cohesion policy in online media. 
Specifically, it has investigated the coverage of cohesion policy in online media; the representation of 
cohesion policy (or not) in online media; the perceptions of cohesion policy as experiences by online 
media users; and the effectiveness of communication activities on cohesion policy by the EU 
institutions, as well as MEPs and candidates.   
The research has covered over 60,000 online news articles in Member States and over 100,000 user-
generated comments. It has also analysed social media - over 11,000 Facebook posts and over five 
million tweets on Twitter – and 13,000 press releases by EU institutions and political parties. This final 
section draws out the main conclusions to emerge. 
a) The visibility of cohesion policy within online news stories is currently low, with many 
references to the policy being little more than an acknowledgement of EU co-financing to 
projects. Cohesion policy is more visible in national media, but regional and local media are 
more likely to provide some depth to their coverage.  
 
b) The tone of media coverage is generally positive and particularly so in regional/local media. 
News stories tend to be framed around the socio-economic effects or implications of the funds 
for countries, regions or localities in terms of economic development, jobs, infrastructure and 
social inclusion. Institutional bargaining is a very dominant sub-frame, with stories giving 
prominence to the reform of the Multiannual Financial Framework 
 
c) There are significant differences across countries in visibility, tone and framing. Member 
States with higher levels of cohesion policy funding tend to have greater visibility and more 
positive tone; they also focus on the implications of cuts to cohesion policy in the MFF 
negotiations whereas coverage in richer countries concentrates more on increased budgetary 
contributions. 
 
d) The proportion of myths in news stories about cohesion policy is relatively low (7 percent 
of stories). Most myths are about fraud, mismanagement and lack of added value of the Funds. 
News stories with myths are most prevalent in some (though not all) of the net payer countries. 
 
e) There is a duality in the thematic coverage of cohesion policy in news stories. There is 
significant coverage of important thematic objectives of the policy – employment, education, 
growth, research and innovation. However, the politics of the Policy is also a significant focus, 
especially of actual or proposed conditionalities of the Funds, and the budget negotiations. 
 
f) The use of social media by EU actors has accelerated in  recent years, with a tripling of 
Facebook (FB) posts from 2017 to 2019. Among political parties, the Greens dominate in using 
FB. However, only a relatively small and diminishing proportion of these FB posts (6 per cent) 
are about cohesion policy. Of these, almost 60 percent of the FB posts are by DG REGIO (Europe 
in my Region), followed (a long way behind) by the CPMR and Commissioner for Regional 
Policy. In terms of tone, most FB posts are neutral, providing factual information, although DG 
REGIO posts are generally positive. 
 
g) Twitter visibility of cohesion policy is relatively low among EP candidates. Around 15 
percent of EP election candidates with a Twitter account tweeted about cohesion policy during 
the period January-June 2019, on average 3 times and in generally positive terms. Within the 
‘Brussels bubble’, DG REGIO produced the largest number of tweets (571) followed by EU 
influencers (typically journalists, EU officials and academics) and interest groups representing 
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regional/local actors (145 tweets). The tone was overwhelmingly positive, significantly more so 
than for the EP candidates  
 
h) Cohesion policy appears to be less visible in institutional press activity. For EU institutions, 
press releases have been a major channel of communication, with 13,000 issued over the 2013-
19 period – some 5,000 from the EU institutions and 8,000 from political parties. The proportion 
of cohesion policy press releases is, though, very low, averaging just 30 per year. 
 
i) Cohesion policy is more visible in the press release activity of the European Commission, 
constituting 4 percent of press releases. It features not just in press releases about the policy 
itself, especially with reference to regions, but in releases on the EU budget and EU investment 
activity. Press releases from the EU institutions tend to focus on socio-economic issues, whereas 
the political parties are more likely to frame their releases in terms of power issues (institutional 
bargaining, empowerment, conditionality etc). 
 
The results of this study, reinforce and extend the findings of previous research by the COHESIFY and 
PERCEIVE projects. The main conclusion is that the visibility and communication of cohesion 
policy in online media has been weak in recent years. News coverage is often shallow, with limited 
depth of understanding or analysis. While regional and local media in particular frequently discuss the 
impacts of funding on regions and localities, there is little appreciation of the wider role or impact of 
the policy. Public discussion about cohesion policy on online media is relatively low key, even though 
there is significant media activity by some EU actors (notably DG REGIO) and national policy 
stakeholders. 
There has been a significant increase in the political priority given to communicating cohesion 
policy in the past three years. This has been led by the European Commission and supported by the 
European Parliament. The post-2020 reform proposal have sought to better integrate communication 
into programming, ensure more consistent branding, and dissemination of the results of strategic 
projects. The Commission has also taken steps to tackle misinformation and improve EU-level 
communication and cooperation with media organisations. There is recognition across all the EU 
institutions of the need to take a more sophisticated approach to communication, particularly the use 
of social media. 
Research and expert interviews highlight the need for a more strategic approach to 
communication through digital media that aims for balanced outreach to target groups, cooperation 
with multipliers and focused on issues that matter to citizens. Effective EU media campaigns also 
require adequate resources and joined up communication across EU, national and subnational levels 
in a continuous process of two-way communication and engagement. 
The main area where progress is needed is in a more citizen-focused cohesion policy. Effective 
citizen engagement is a crucial pre-requisite to raise the visibility of cohesion policy in online media. 
Yet research indicates that citizens do not feel well-informed or engaged in the process of developing 
and implementing EU-funded regional development strategies affecting their region or locality. 
Notwithstanding the proposed Policy Objective 5 (Europe closer to citizens), there is a need for a more 
horizontal approach to programming across all POs to exploit opportunities for direct engagement 
with citizens (rather than only representative bodies). This would, in turn, provide a foundation – and 
the feedstock – for much more citizen-focused communication, focusing on issues that matter directly 
to citizens, engaging in more substantive dialogues with citizens and providing opportunities to 
exploit multipliers.  
Our key recommendation is that part of the budget of ‘PO5 - A European Closer to Citizens’ and 
of Technical Assistance at European Commission and Member State level should be earmarked 
to participatory budgeting. Such democratic innovations should be applied to localised urban and 
rural development initiatives that are closer to citizens. Implementing democratic innovations is not 
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easy and requires strong planning, leadership, capacity and resources. Pilot projects on participatory 
budgeting should be encouraged across EU Member States and the results should be made available 
to the REGI committee in order to inform its future work agenda and reports. As the direct 
representatives of European citizens, the European Parliament should be bold and strive to ensure that 
the public have a say on what is funded in their local area by one of the largest and most visible areas 
of EU expenditure impacting on their daily lives.  
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9. ANNEXES  
Subframes on cohesion policy 
NAME OF SUBFRAME 
 
DESCRIPTION OF                                                                 SUBFRAME CONTENT 
  
1. Job Creation CP creates jobs and provides training to the unemployed. This is particularly 
important where there are few employment opportunities are and a low skilled 
labour force.  
CP examples: employment subsidies, training programmes, apprenticeship 
programmes. 
 
2. Social justice  
 
CP promotes equal opportunities, protects vulnerable social groups (immigrants, 
people with special needs) and reduces the gap between rich and poor groups. CP 
tackles deficiencies in national policy/legal frameworks through dedicated support 
promoting equal opportunities.  
CP examples: Incentives for the adoption of good practices that promote non-
discrimination and gender equality in the work environment; training for 
vulnerable groups to facilitate integration in society and the labour market; 
infrastructure that promotes accessibility to public spaces/services; and financial 
support for the most disadvantaged groups. 
3. Social awareness & 
inclusion 
 
CP aims to raise citizens' awareness of social exclusion and civic responsibility to 
promote a sense of community. This is crucial to tackle xenophobia/racism, 
individualism, a weak sense of community and awareness of social problems that 
marginalises vulnerable social groups from society.  
CP examples: support events and seminars to build trust and a sense of community 
among citizens, to promote awareness against racism, xenophobia and social 
exclusion. 
4. Economic 
development  
 
CP promotes economic development activity, creates new business opportunities, 
promotes entrepreneurship and stimulates investment. This is particularly 
important to counter the effects of the economic and financial crises on economic 
activity.  
CP examples: Financial and non-financial incentives/grants and other instruments 
for investment projects. 
5. Research & innovation 
 
CP funds research and innovation and raise the quality of workforce skills to 
address outdated production methods and limited use of new technologies, which 
in turn lead to lower production, skills and funding for research, development and 
training.  
CP examples: investments in R&D, new technologies and production methods, 
promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship, organization of training seminars 
for workers and funding for universities to promote research. 
6. Tackle brain drain 
 
CP provides funding for investments that will help the country retain its scientific 
personnel. Many young and educated individuals migrate abroad in order to find 
employment because of the financial/economic crisis and lack of investment.  
CP examples: incentives for  investment to create employment opportunities 
within the country to stop the brain drain. 
7. Public services  
 
CP can modernize public administration, social security, public health, public 
education and promote e-governance. Due to the low quality and inefficiency of 
public services (e.g. outdated systems, lack of computerized public services) 
citizens' transactions with the state are administratively complex and time-
consuming.  
CP examples: creation of e-public administration to provide high quality services 
for citizens; simplification of transactions between citizens and the state by 
reducing bureaucracy; quality control for public services; introduction of new 
technology and expertise to raise the quality of public services/health/ education 
etc. 
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8. Infrastructure 
 
CP invests in infrastructure and policies that improve citizens' everyday life. In 
doing so, CP addresses deficits in basic infrastructure and services (e.g. parks, 
squares, public transportation, pedestrian streets, cycle lanes, broadband), the lack 
of local public funding and planning, as well as outdated practices and facilities.  
CP examples: construction of new parks, squares, streets, bicycle lanes etc.; 
adoption of new strategies/plans (e.g. transport plans). 
9. Environment  
 
CP invests in environmental protection and promotes environment-friendly 
technologies. This addresses pollution, destruction/waste of natural resources, 
degradation of the natural landscape. It also raises environmental protection 
standards, unregulated development and limited investment in sustainable  
technologies.  
CP examples: adoption of environmental regulations/standards; promotion of 
"green" policies (e.g. recycling) and technologies; implementation of “green” 
projects; establishment of institutions to monitor environmental conditions. 
10. Cultural heritage  
 
CP invests in promoting cultural heritage to address the poor condition of 
archaeological and historical monuments, lack of civic awareness/interest, funding 
and planning in cultural heritage.  
CP examples: schemes to develop archaeological and historical sites, restoration of 
monuments, promotion of policies to raise awareness. 
11. Cultural 
development  
 
CP aims to provide motivation and support for local artists, athletes and more 
cultural production due to limited availability of financial support, spaces for 
cultural expression, stadiums and training centres for athletes.  
CP examples: financial support and motivation for artistic creation, construction of 
new or renovation of old theatres music halls, sports centres, stadiums and training 
facilities, funding and promotion of artistic events. 
12. Civic participation/ 
collaboration  
 
CP promotes collaboration between authorities and citizens in order to support 
vulnerable social groups. Citizens are not sufficiently engaged in collaborative 
action for supporting their communities owing to the absence of participatory 
projects.  
CP examples: funding projects that promote citizens’ involvement in collaborative 
action to support their communities. 
13. Territorial 
cooperation 
 
CP funds promote territorial cooperation, improving relations with neighbouring 
countries/regions and protecting territorial rights and security from third countries' 
aggression.  
CP examples: promotion of cross-border cooperation among member states, 
members and non-members, promotion of EU investment in disputed borderline 
areas to establish territorial rights. 
14. Ineffective goal 
achievement (economic 
development etc.) 
CP goals and aspirations are not achieved in practice and many CP projects do not 
bring the desired results. Ineffective implementation might occur for various 
reasons, but the bottom line is that CP cannot be considered an effective 
mechanism for economic, social or territorial development (e.g. RTDI development, 
cultural development, better infrastructure, environmental protection, combatting 
unemployment, bringing social justice, territorial cooperation, and positive 
contribution to increasing civic participation) 
15. Solidarity towards 
poor countries or 
regions 
CP is an expression of solidarity and aims to raise citizens' trust in the EU by 
reducing disparities between EU countries and regions. CP contributes to solidarity 
by providing funding to less-developed regions in particular, in order to reduce 
development gaps between European regions and Member states.  
16. Financial burden 
 
The EU and CP drains national resources in order to provide funds for EU projects. 
The EU takes money from developed and hard-working countries to subsidise 
weak economies. The EU wastes money on unnecessary projects with the rich 
paying for the poor. EU officials do not care for national interests. One solution 
could be to leave the EU. 
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17. Improve governance 
of public funding 
CP provides funding and rules that promote good governance at all levels 
(national/regional/local) can enforce legal order. National authorities have been 
reluctant or indifferent to resolving domestic governance problems, to enforce 
legal order and to comply with EU rules and standards. National authorities must 
meet specific governance requirements in order to receive funding from CP. 
18. Bureaucracy & 
delays 
CP provides funding for the implementation of projects yet the procedures for 
applying for funding are very complicated for beneficiary organisations. 
Bureaucratic rules delay payments as well as the absorption of funds. There is a 
need to simplify application procedures and reduce bureaucracy. 
19. Mismanagement of 
funds 
 
CP is mismanaged by domestic authorities that fail to comply with EU rules, to 
meeting planned objectives and to deliver results within specified time-frames. 
The implementation of projects creates new problems for local authorities, due to 
weaknesses in design, audit and control, and delays. Domestic authorities' 
inefficiency slows spending or leads to financial suspensions or corrections by the 
EU. 
 
20. Fraud and 
Corruption 
 
EU funding is misused fraudulently and undermined by corruption among 
national/local public officials who try to exploit EU funds for their own personal 
gains. These problems are aggravated by the lack or inefficiency of control 
mechanisms. Member states that do not comply with EU regulations or were 
caught for fraud need to be punished or have their funds suspended. 
21. Poor communication 
of funding 
opportunities and rules  
 
Beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries are not well-informed about opportunities 
or EU rules. This can lead to slow and non-compliant spending. To make CP 
effective, national/subnational authorities should launch publicity campaigns to 
inform potential beneficiaries of opportunities. Institutions need to be created to 
better promote and manage funding applications.  
22. Empowerment of 
subnational institutions 
CP empowers subnational institutions since national authorities manage budgets 
and funding and subnational authorities are often excluded from decision-making. 
Solutions include the direct transfer of CP funds to subnational authorities and 
providing them with greater autonomy to decide on how to invest in development. 
23. Lose sovereignty 
 
CP funding obligations imply a loss national sovereignty to EU institutions. CP is an 
tool for the EU to interfere with national matters and competences. To avoid this 
trap requires leaving the EU or ending the EU commitment to a political union.  
24. Political leverage 
 
CP is used by European authorities to put pressure on national governments who 
do not comply with EU rules. Through conditionality, EU institutions try to enforce 
reforms in member states e.g. complying with economic governance rules, rule of 
law or migration quotas. Potential alternatives could be to separate cohesion 
policy funding from the implementation of other EU policies; or in the case of 
economic governance rules, to exempt member states' contributions to cohesion 
policy from budget deficit calculations. 
25. Institutional 
bargaining over funding 
The size and distribution of CP funding is politicized and contested. At EU level, 
funding allocations are disputed between net payers and recipients, and between 
EU institutions (Parliament, Council, Commission, Committee of the Regions) 
during MFF negotiations. Similar politicization and bargaining over funding 
redistribution takes place at national and subnational levels.  
26. Political 
capital/interests 
 
CP projects are exploited by national/subnational actors for political purposes by 
claiming credit or attributing blame and/or to increase their political influence. 
Citizens are misled to believe that EU funded projects are initiated by local/national 
political actors downplaying or ignoring the EU role.  
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